

The Harvard
Undergraduate
Foreign Policy
Initiative



A UNITED FRONT: REBUILDING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

How the US and EU
can preserve the
democratic world
order as China takes
the stage.

Spring 2021

Authors: Luis Esteva Sueiro (Chair), Elliott Detjen, Willem Ebbinge, Jack Leland,
Stephanie Lin, Elliott Mokski, Ryan Tierney

Policy Director: Lauren Morganbesser

Commissioned by: The Honorable Laura Hochla, White House National Security Council
Director for European Affairs

Cover Design by Ryan Tierney

Copyrighted under Creative Commons CC0C

Photo by Nandhu Kumar, licensed under PxHere License
https://c.pxhere.com/photos/6b/f8/strasbourg_european_parliament_building_europe_eu_flag-1322766.jpg!d

Authors: Luis Esteva Sueiro (Chair), Elliott Detjen, Willem Ebbinge, Jack Leland, Stephanie Lin, Elliott Mokski, Ryan Tierney

Policy Director: Lauren Morganbesser

Commissioned by: The Honorable Laura Hochla, White House National Security Council Director for European Affairs



A United Front: Rebuilding the Transatlantic Partnership

Harvard Undergraduate Foreign Policy Initiative (HUFPI)
Harvard University
Spring 2021

Prepared for:

*The Honorable Laura Hochla, White House National Security Council Director for
European Affairs*

Members:

Luis Esteva Sueiro (Chair)
Elliott Detjen
Willem Ebbinge
Jack Leland
Stephanie Lin
Elliott Mokski
Ryan Tierney

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Ms. Laura Hochla and the National Security Council Directorate for European Affairs for supporting the curiosity of students and providing us with the opportunity to engage in the art of statecraft, especially with regard to democratic cooperation, a topic that we are all deeply interested in and passionate about. We sincerely hope that our work has contributed to the preservation and flourishing of democracy in the US, European Union, and beyond.

Furthermore, we would like to thank LTG H.R. McMaster, Mr. John Bolton, Mr. Isaac Stone Fish, and Ms. Donatienne Ruy for their willingness to speak with us on topics relevant to our project. They provided invaluable direction and guidance, without which our project would certainly have not been as detailed, comprehensive, or insightful. We would especially extend our gratitude to Mr. Fernando Bizarro, who patiently and skillfully shared his expertise in the creation of indices with our team. Without his mentorship our index would not have been possible and our project would not have been as enriching.

Finally, I would like to personally express my gratitude to the six undergraduates who dedicated their valuable and preciously rare time to late nights of research, all day writing sessions, and passionate discussions. Working with them these past few months, I can say with certainty that this will be but the first of many contributions they make to the field of diplomacy, as well as any other endeavor they may yet set their sights upon. I am honored to have had the privilege of leading this team and look forward to seeing what the future holds for them.

Luis Esteva Sueiro
Chair, Harvard '24

ABOUT THE HARVARD UNDERGRADUATE FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE

The mission of the Harvard Undergraduate Foreign Policy Initiative (HUFPI) is to bring prominent figures who have worked in foreign policy and national security to Harvard's campus to inspire students. Speakers include former Ambassadors, Congressmen and women, Secretaries, Expert Practitioners, and Academics alike. HUFPI is also an undergraduate think-tank consisting of over 190 students conducting policy research projects for think-tanks, non-profits, and Congressional Offices part of the House Intelligence and Foreign Affairs Committee. Our policy projects expand a range of topics pertaining to foreign affairs- from tackling climate change, to supporting social movements, to combating the global spread of opioids. With the support of the Harvard Undergraduate Council, the Institute of Politics, the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, the Reagan Fund, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, HUFPI aspires to encourage more undergraduates to seek opportunities in foreign policy, national security, and diplomacy.

HUFPI was founded in 2019 in order to fill the gap between a large undergraduate interest in US foreign policy and the lack of opportunities to engage in doing so. Given the pivotal political moment we're living in and the nascent but increasingly burgeoning relevance of healthy foreign affairs, this program is the first of its kind here at Harvard. By (1) providing speakers with the platform to inspire Harvard undergraduates to enter careers in diplomacy, (2) policy research projects that impact nonprofits, think tanks, and congressional legislations, (3) career panels to educate undergraduates on their journeys (4) centralizing a database for foreign affairs internships and professional connections in such fields, they have the ability to shape the future of foreign affairs.

This report is a semester-long intensive effort by a dedicated team of 7 undergraduate students. HUFPI does not endorse specific policy positions, so all views expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the authors.

Harvard Undergraduate Foreign Policy Initiative (HUFPI)
120 Student Organization Center at Hilles
59 Shepard Street Cambridge, MA
<https://www.harvardforeignpolicy.org/>

Executive Summary

A period of deteriorating trust between the United States and the European Union due to trade disputes, diplomatic spats, and uncertainty on both ends has exacerbated the strategic and economic decoupling between the two democratic juggernauts. Unfortunately, this growing divide coincides with the geopolitical rise of China and its growing influence around the world, especially amongst emerging economies in Africa, Central & Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. Beijing's spreading sway, however, is not from hard power, such as the creation of military bases and alliances (although it should be noted that it established its first overseas military base in the strategically important East African nation of Djibouti in 2017 and has been rapidly increasing the capabilities of its navy since 2015).¹

China has instead been expanding its economic network, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a push to finance global infrastructure aimed at facilitating trade around the world and reviving the spirit of the silk road supported by the Chinese-born Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).² While the development of worldwide transportation networks, economic investment in emerging economies, and growing opportunities for trade would certainly be incredibly beneficial to people all around the world, the US and EU should be concerned by its deep ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Xi Jinping due to its long and well recorded history of human rights abuses, crackdowns on individual freedoms, and outright authoritarianism.

To effectively counter China and prevent the spread of its aforementioned values, the US cannot act alone, and must reaffirm and rally its alliances in Oceania, East Asia, the Americas, and most importantly, Europe, before it can look to competition. Washington cannot stop there, however, and must seek to provide a counterbalance to Beijing's growing economic network, even if it cannot defeat it. Furthermore, the democratic coalition must also recognize that as the world treks farther into the 21st century, new theaters of competition in the fields of technology and information are opening up and cannot be brushed aside. Lastly, China has so entrenched itself in the world order that it would not be feasible nor advantageous to try and completely isolate them. Furthermore, issues such as the looming climate crisis will require cooperation between the great powers to solve.

In a data-driven effort to analyze and achieve these objectives, our team additionally developed an index to measure the approximate level of potential for bilateral economic cooperation between each EU member state and China or the United States.

With these goals in mind the United States should:

- Restore closer economic ties with the EU and explore the creation of a free trade zone open to nations that meet certain standards of market openness, individual freedoms, and democratic institutions.
- In partnership with the EU, establish a "Democracy Bank" (DemBank) to serve as an alternative to the AIIB around the world, with a particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe.

¹ Huang, Kristin. "Size of China's Navy May Be Closing Gap on US Fleet but What Can the PLA Do with Just One Overseas Naval Base?" *The Star Online*, Star Media Group Berhad, 16 Mar. 2021, www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2021/03/16/size-of-chinas-navy-may-be-closing-gap-on-us-fleet-but-what-can-the-pla-do-with-just-one-overseas-naval-base.

² Dollar, David. "The AIIB and the 'One Belt, One Road.'" *Brookings*, The Brookings Institution, 7 Sept. 2017, www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/.

- Increase cooperation with Europe on IT issues such as data collection and availability, 5G deployment and competition with Huawei, development of O-RAN technologies, and establishment of interoperability standards for greater facility in business collaboration and network equipment deployment. Specifically in the region of Africa, it is imperative to collaborate with European telecom companies to provide more secure Western alternatives alongside financing supported by the DemBank subsidies and other incentives.
- Revitalize and revise former climate agreements with China in an attempt to reestablish cooperation between the two powers.
- Furthermore, the US must consider member states of the EU on an individual basis in addition to looking at the Union as a whole in order to effectively address unique circumstances defining the bilateral relationships between European nations, the US, and China.

Furthermore, recognizing China's unique status as arguably the longest continuous civilization in the world, and the rhetoric it surrounds itself with as a result, the US and EU cannot treat China as another great power in the western sense. It is imperative that they approach competition with Beijing from a lens of cultural understanding and ideological emphasis.

SETTING THE STAGE

Coordinating a unified front with the diverse patchwork of nations that comprise the European Union is a trying ordeal for the Europeans themselves, let alone another party like the United States. In order to create an effective framework to encourage collaboration, it is imperative to formulate a comprehensive understanding and analysis of the geopolitical chessboard as it stands. To facilitate this broad task, contextualization of the EU as a whole can be divided into four different categories (treaties and trade, competition abroad, information & technology, and cooperation), while individual member states can be addressed on an ad hoc basis depending on whether their relationship is too unique to fall under the umbrella of the entire EU.

Ideology

Before launching into contextual analysis, however, it is important to recognize the role played by ideology, both in motivating the respective players in the great game, but also in furthering their agenda, at home and abroad.

Strategically, the China question is one typically framed in the lens of economics, and rightly so. Unlike the Soviet Union, it is less concerned with the spread of its ideology and political system, and more with the expansion of its trade network and diplomatic leverage. However, it would leave an incomplete understanding of Beijing's actions, strategy, and motives to treat it as a purely economic actor, and ignore the history, culture, and ideology at the core of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and behind it, in the collective social memory of China as a civilization in and of itself. The United States and the European Union must then also bring ideology to the heart of the competition with China, emphasizing to their people and the world the differences between the liberal democratic model of capitalism and the repressive autocratic "China Model," and the importance of preserving the values and lifestyle of the former from the growing influence of the latter. More importantly, however, in attempting to compete, the democracies must also take a page out of Sun Tzu's book, and ensure they know their enemy.

In his book *On China*, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger focuses on several strategic dichotomies between the Western and Chinese mindsets: confrontation and subtlety, short-term and long-term planning, total victory and protracted campaigning. Whereas the West's strategy resembles the game of chess — a game designed for decisive plays and immediate confrontation — China frames conflict through the ideal of *wei qi*, a game designed for long-term strategy, the art of entering empty spaces, encirclement, and a slow accumulation of "relative advantage." Kissinger writes on the integration of the work of Sun Tzu as another hallmark, wherein psychological and political factors carry equal or greater weight than physical war itself.³

It is helpful to cast the policies of China and the West over the last decade within such a framework. While the United States develops foreign policy on a seemingly four year cycle, President Xi

³ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. Allen Lane, 2011, pp. 23-26.

has solidified his position for life and penned China's national interest and strategy into its constitution.⁴ One of China's more salient instruments, the Belt and Road Initiative, is a key example of both filling "empty spaces" and procuring long-term relative advantage. Ensuring opacity across data, transactions, and intentions, China harnesses the power of indirect ambiguity in contrast with a rules-based Western liberal order of transparency and cooperation. For the West to compete on a level playing field, it must actively work to resolve certain shortcomings of democracy — short-sightedness, misguided popular will, and frequent changes of administration — by embracing systems of coordination, bilateral and bipartisan consensus, and cohesion alongside our democratic norms. Otherwise, the short-term incongruencies of the West will prove its greatest disadvantage against a Chinese strategy of foresight, misdirection, and long-term relative advantage.

All Under Heaven

Unlike most other states, which have named themselves after a group of people (France and the Franks), a place (The United States of America), or a geographic feature (Nippon (Japan) meaning "the Land of the Rising Sun"), China, on the other hand, calls itself Zhongguo, literally "The Middle Kingdom" or "Central Country." Throughout most, if not all of its history, China viewed itself not just as a great empire in a world of others, but as the eternal pinnacle of civilization.⁵ Although the great kingdom occasionally fractured into competing warlords, it was always reunited under a great leader and restored to its enduring glory. Even the founding myth of Chinese civilization reflects this mentality of a divine presence. In contrast to stories like that of Romulus and Remus founding the city of Rome, the Tale of the Yellow Emperor describes an empire being reunited from the ashes, not being created, as if it had existed since the dawn of time.

Mao Tse Tung, founder of the People's Republic of China, avidly consumed these tales, namely *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, another Chinese reunification story.⁶ He clearly envisioned himself as the next Yellow Emperor, to reunify China after the "Century of Humiliation," a term he coined for the era of foreign intervention in China from 1839-1949.

Following the Century of Humiliation, the CCP has vowed never to fall victim to the wills and militaries of foreign powers again.⁷ This "Never Again" mentality is a central driver of Xi Jinping's objectives and Beijing's enduring strategy. The difference between China and the West is that in the West, especially the US, losing is not as significant. The vast majority of the American and French populations were unaffected directly by the defeat in Vietnam, likewise few have had much of a stake in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to other counterterrorism operations. China, on the other hand, holds tightly to its memories of the Opium wars, Boxer rebellion, and humiliation in World War II and pushes rhetoric emphasizing the need for strength in order to prevent a repeat of the past.⁸

⁴ Shepard, Wade. "Why China Just Added The Belt And Road Initiative To Its Constitution." *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 18 May 2018, www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/10/25/why-china-just-added-the-belt-and-road-initiative-to-its-constitution/?sh=44553bfa42ab.

⁵ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. Allen Lane, 2011.

⁶ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. Allen Lane, 2011.

⁷ Tischler, Mark. "China's 'Never Again' Mentality ." *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 20 Aug. 2020, www.thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality/.

⁸ Yan, Alice. "Chinese People Must Never Forget the Nanking Massacre Dead: Museum Curator." *South China Morning Post*, South China Morning Post Publishers, 17 Jan. 2018, www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1737923/chinese-people-must-never-forget-nanking-massacre-dead-museum-curator.

Western Optics

For the United States to claim the moral high ground in the competition with China as the defender of democracy, freedom, and equality, it must serve as a prime example of them as well. America's greatest advantage over China is its reputation around the world as the, albeit flawed, bastion of democracy.

In the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests against an extradition law pushed by Beijing, protestors often invoked the symbols of the United States: its flag and its anthem, among others (see Figure 1).⁹ In early January 2020, students protesting against the Iranian government deliberately avoided walking on American and Israeli flags that had been painted on the ground as a sign of disrespect.¹⁰ Around the rest of the world, the US is still overwhelmingly preferred as the world leader over China (shown in Figure 1), a promising sign for the preservation and expansion of a democratic world order.

The US and the EU, the dual bulwarks of democracy (along with their allies in Asia and Oceania), therefore must continue to uphold and champion those democratic values not despite them being threatened, but because they are being threatened. In order to effectively counter China and build a sustainable world order, America and the EU cannot compromise their values as they attempt to strengthen and broaden their influence.

The European Union

Treaties and Trade

In the past four years, the once unquestionable alliance between the United States and the member states of the European Union has been slowly replaced by a partnership mired in doubt.

Although still robust strategic allies through their membership in NATO, uncertainty regarding the reliability of American military and economic support has led many European leaders to look towards developing "strategic autonomy," and it would no longer be accurate to view the two as a geopolitical bloc.¹¹ The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI),¹² although not yet signed, demonstrates that European nations are becoming less and less aligned with the United States on how they interact with China through economic policy and is the first tangible result of European doubts in American commitment reflected in global competition with China.




Figure 1: "America's Global Image." Pew Research Center

⁹ "America's Global Image." *Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project*, Pew Research Center, 24 July 2020, www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/23/1-america-s-global-image/.

¹⁰ "Iran Students Refuse to Walk over US and Israeli Flags." *BBC News*, BBC, 12 Jan. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-51084619.

¹¹ *Recovery Plan: Powering Europe's Strategic Autonomy - Speech by President Charles Michel at the Brussels Economic Forum*. 8 Sept. 2020, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/09/08/recovery-plan-powering-europe-s-strategic-autonomy-speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-brussels-economic-forum/

¹² "EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)." *Trade*, The European Commission, 22 Jan. 2021, <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2237>

The CAI is a recent investment agreement made bilaterally between the EU and China in which China eliminates quantitative restrictions, equity caps, and joint venture requirements, among other protectionist policies, in order to clear the way for EU investment in a wide variety of key sectors, namely: manufacturing, telecomms, construction services, and international maritime transport (including relevant land-based auxiliary activities).¹³

The EU has also pushed China to agree to a series of commitments on labor (in an attempt to mitigate repeated allegations of labor abuses) and environmental standards, transparency, and the discipline of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) if they do not act in accordance with agreed CAI obligations.¹⁴ The CAI also attempts to create monitoring and enforcement mechanisms as well as dispute settlement frameworks in order to ensure China abides by the terms of the agreement.

Yet despite European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen tweeting that the agreement will “uphold [their] interests & [promote their] core values” and “provide [them] a lever to eradicate forced labor,” there is broad skepticism as to Europe’s capability to actually enforce any rules on China due to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) self-admitted incompatibility with western values.¹⁵ Shi Yinhong, an advisor to China’s State Council told the Financial Times that “On labor it’s impossible for China to agree,” adding the rhetorical question, “can you imagine China with independent labor unions?” and damningly admitting that addressing “forced labor also relates to Xinjiang, so that’s another ‘no’ for China.”

The CAI is a disappointing start to US-EU relations on China under Biden because, as The Economist puts it, it hands China “an early [political] victory over Joe Biden,” to the benefit of “a few German carmakers, European insurance companies and other well-connected firms,” driven by doubts in the strength of the transatlantic partnership.

That being said, there is broad resistance to the CAI within the EU upon which the US could still capitalize. Poland and Italy, for example, have complained that, during their presidency of the EU Council, Germany rushed the agreement despite a lack of consensus among other member states before their term was up.¹⁶

Europe’s inclination to sign onto the CAI and drift away from the US as an inseparable partner, however, cannot be understood independently of American actions driving the divide. Otherwise strong in the past, the US-EU trade relationship has experienced strain over the last four years as a byproduct of rising populism, protectionism, and the Trump Administration’s frictional rhetoric and policy. While the US has adopted a more confrontational and security-based approach to trade, using it as a tool to combat China and other adversaries directly, the EU follows policy more in line with its “strategic autonomy” doctrine, optimizing for rules-based diplomacy, economic, and soft-power interests.¹⁷

As China has signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—a free trade agreement with the Asia-Pacific and the largest ever in terms of GDP and population—and the European CAI more

¹³ “Key Elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.” *European Commission Press Corner*, EU, 30 Dec. 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2542

¹⁴ Cave Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu. “Uyghurs For Sale.” *ASPI*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1 Mar. 2020, www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale

¹⁵ Fallon, Theresa. “The Strategic Implications of the China-EU Investment Deal.” *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 5 Jan. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-strategic-implications-of-the-china-eu-investment-deal/>

¹⁶ Fallon, Theresa. “The Strategic Implications of the China-EU Investment Deal.” *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 5 Jan. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-strategic-implications-of-the-china-eu-investment-deal/>

¹⁷ Dempsey, Judy. “Judy Asks: Is Europe Ready to Work With the United States on China?” *Carnegie Europe*, Carnegie Europe, 10 Dec. 2020, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/83425>.

recently, the US has moved in the opposite direction.¹⁸ In 2017 the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and in 2019 President Trump obstructed the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a free trade agreement with Europe. Likewise, the Trump Administration also initiated an “artificial trade war” with the EU, inflicting tariffs and heated rhetoric.¹⁹

With economic statecraft dominating the geopolitical chessboard, market access is a crucial plank that has been exploited in favor of China and shunned to the detriment of the US. If not the opening of new trade agreements, removing barbs like existing tariffs will be key in repairing US-EU relations while also inserting “levers of influence” to counter China.

The World Bank

In 1944, the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference was convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to lay the groundwork for the post-WWII international monetary system.²⁰ Fueled by an appetite for globalization that went on to define the Cold War era, the conference established the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later part of the World Bank Group). Since their inception, these two institutions have grown to accommodate 190 countries (including the U.S, China, and the EU member-states), and while they often operate in overlapping spheres, they have retained their distinct mission sets.²¹

The International Monetary Fund, or IMF, is primarily concerned with “[ensuring] the stability of the international monetary system,” so while it does lend money to member countries, it does so to prevent economic crises, not to fund development projects.²²

By contrast, the World Bank Group (WBG) is far more relevant in the context of coordinated financing, as its primary commitment is to “reducing poverty, increasing shared prosperity, and promoting sustainable development” through investment in growing economies.²³ Its financing component, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), acquires most of its funds through borrowing on the international bond market, with only 10% of its capital coming from member-state payments.²⁴ This adds to a total of \$184 billion in authorized capital, allowing the Bank to loan nearly \$54.8 billion globally in 2020 alone.²⁵

This infrastructure, which first proved its resilience in the years of Western-European reconstruction following the Second World War, could prove to be an invaluable resource for facilitating coordinated US-EU development projects in Eastern Europe and Africa, two areas where the WBG is

¹⁸ Solana, Javier, and Eugenio Bregolat. “Biden Can Pass His China Test.” *Brookings*, The Brookings Institution, 26 Jan. 2021, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/26/biden-can-pass-his-china-test/.

¹⁹ Fallor, Evan. “US-EU Trade Deal Seen Remote Even If Biden Occupies White House in 2021.” *Market Intelligence*, S&P Global, 19 Oct. 2020, www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/us-eu-trade-deal-seen-remote-even-if-biden-occupies-white-house-in-2021-60606405.

²⁰ “The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944.” *U.S. Department of State*, U.S. Department of State, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.htm>.

²¹ Schulze, Elizabeth. “Understanding the Difference between the IMF and World Bank.” *CNBC*, CNBC, 14 Oct. 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/10/14/understanding-the-difference-between-the-imf-and-world-bank.html.

²² “About the IMF.” *IMF*, International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org/en/About.

²³ “Who We Are.” *The World Bank*, World Bank Group, www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are.

²⁴ “Our Funding.” *International Finance Cooperation*, World Bank Group, www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC_New/Investor+Relations/Fundi ng/.

²⁵ “Annual Report 2020.” *World Bank*, 2020, www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report.

already actively funding development. Nearly \$21 billion and \$7 billion were allocated to projects in Africa and Eastern Europe respectively in 2020.²⁶

However, the scale of these investments pale in comparison to the aforementioned Chinese “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative. Financed partly through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an institution comparable to the World Bank, the project is rumored to cost between one and eight trillion USD.²⁷ If the US and EU want to match Chinese capital commitments through an investment project of their own, it would, at the very least, be difficult for the World Bank to accommodate such a large-scale, targeted investment.

In addition, the US and EU member states are not the only countries whom the World Bank serves and receives its funding from. Indeed, China too is a prominent shareholder of the World Bank. They hold 5.05% of the total votes in the WBG’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (compared to France’s 4% and Germany’s 4.3%), they hold 2 of the 32 World Bank leadership positions, and in 2016 they even issued their first special drawing rights (SDR) bond to the Group.²⁸ This influence has allowed the Chinese government, which hosts the world’s second-largest economy and is currently sitting on nearly \$3 trillion of cash reserves, to maintain its status as a “developing nation” in the eyes of the WBG.²⁹ It has also allowed them to receive nearly \$7.8 billion in World Bank loans since 2016, the second-largest single country recipient in the world, despite surpassing the bank’s income threshold for lending that same year.³⁰

Finally, the World Bank Group, by the nature of its mission, does not place immense weight on a country’s political system or human rights record when weighing the distribution of its grants. There is no prerequisite for democratic institutions attached to World Bank loans, allowing autocratic governments like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and China to receive funds just as easily as young democracies.³¹

Luckily, the US and EU’s combined influence in the World Bank Group far surpasses China’s. They collectively hold nearly 38% of the votes in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the bank itself is headquartered in Washington DC) and the US is the only World Bank Group shareholder who holds veto power over certain structural changes within the institution. In short, the US and EU have the influence and resources necessary to reshape the WBG, but they will have to leverage this power if they want to facilitate an investment initiative.

Competition Abroad

US FDI in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE)

A legacy of the communist era, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has lagged behind its Western counterparts in critical sectors like energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure. In 2015, the US

²⁶ “Annual Report 2020.” *World Bank*, 2020, www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report.

²⁷ Hillman, Jonathan E. “How Big Is China's Belt and Road?” *CSIS*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3 Apr. 2018, www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road.

²⁸ “World Bank Approved as the First SDR Bond Issuer in China.” *World Bank*, World Bank Group, 12 Aug. 2016, www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/08/12/world-bank-approved-as-the-first-sdr-bond-issuer-in-china.

²⁹ Beaubien, Jason. “Flush With Cash, China Continues to Borrow Billions From The World Bank.” *NPR*, NPR, 31 Jan. 2019, www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/01/31/689960866/flush-with-cash-china-continues-to-borrow-billions-from-world-bank.

³⁰ Lawder, David. “World Bank Adopts \$1 Billion-plus Annual China Lending Plan over U.S. Objections.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 6 Dec. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-china-idUSKBN1YA038.

³¹ “Annual Report 2020.” *World Bank*, 2020, www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report.

established the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) to close the development gap, bolster regional energy independence, and stave off Chinese and Russian influence. Days before the 2020 election, the Trump Administration reiterated its commitment to invest up to \$1 billion in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) — doing so with bipartisan support.³²

Running parallel to the 3SI, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was bipartisanly instituted in 2018. Positioned as an alternative to “state-directed investments by authoritarian governments” by leveraging private investment to supplement conventional aid, the DFC has a lending cap of \$60 billion.³³ In 2020, the DFC partnered with the 3SI to pledge \$300 million to the initiative and match 30% of combined contributions by 3SI members, up to \$1 billion.³⁴

While promising, the US-led investments still fight an uphill battle with China’s FDI commitments within the broader BRI, reaching nearly \$800 billion since 2013.³⁵ However, some winds have started to shift. Entering into the “17+1” Summit (formerly 16+1) in 2012, several CEE countries have since been disillusioned over the decade. In 2021, half of the invited EU countries snubbed President Xi by refusing to send their national leaders to the conference.³⁶ Falling short of lavish promises, Chinese FDI in the EU has since declined to 2013 levels.³⁷ The Chinese “divide and conquer” European strategy has also been met with growing skepticism, even as President Xi offered to double China’s food imports from Eastern Europe to antagonize protectionist Western farming strongholds. The attraction toward NATO in the face of Russian security concerns has likewise drawn countries like those in the Baltics toward the Western fold and away from Beijing’s increasingly empty promises.³⁸

With domestic bipartisan support in Congress and across presidential administrations, US initiatives have a ripe opportunity to deepen their regional diplomatic and economic role in the face of growing CEE ambivalence. If nothing else, Brussels and Washington cannot close the CEE €1.15 trillion gap by acting apart.³⁹ To not fully engage with the region will leave a critical blindspot, compromising both European “strategic autonomy” and US foreign primacy.

EU FDI in CEE

Similarly to the 3SI by the United States, the European Union has also attempted to increase its cooperation with nations in CEE. It has developed the Eastern Partnership, a framework designed to

³² Chazan, Yigal. “Comment: US Signals Support for European Infrastructure Overhaul.” *International Investment*, Incisive Media, 12 Nov. 2020, www.internationalinvestment.net/opinion/4023185/comment-us-signals-support-european-infrastructure-overhaul.

³³ Kliman, Daniel. “Leverage the New US International Development Finance Corporation to Compete with China.” *TheHill*, Capitol Hill Publishing Corp., 16 Nov. 2018, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/416904-leverage-us-international-development-finance-corporation-compete-with-china>.

³⁴ Chazan, Yigal. “Comment: US Signals Support for European Infrastructure Overhaul.” *International Investment*, Incisive Media, 12 Nov. 2020, www.internationalinvestment.net/opinion/4023185/comment-us-signals-support-european-infrastructure-overhaul.

³⁵ Nedopil, Christoph. “Investments in the Belt and Road Initiative.” *Green Belt and Road Initiative Center*, International Institute for Green Finance, 2021, <https://green-bri.org/investments-in-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>.

³⁶ Lau, Stuart. “China’s Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the Cold Shoulder.” *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 9 Feb. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/.

³⁷ Kratz, Agatha, et al. “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update.” *MERICs*, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 8 Apr. 2020, <https://merics.org/en/report/chinese-fdi-europe-2019-update>.

³⁸ Lau, Stuart. “China’s Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the Cold Shoulder.” *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 9 Feb. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/.

³⁹ “Massive Gap in Infrastructure Investments in Central and Eastern Europe Compared to Western Europe.” *Three Seas Initiative*, 2021, www.3seas.eu/media/news/imf-study-reveals-1-15-trillion-euro-gap-in-infrastructure-investments-in-central-and-eastern-europe-compared-to-western-europe.

foster mutual cooperation between the Union and six countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.⁴⁰ The program provides direct financial incentives for development to member nations and allows access to the European market in certain economic sectors. Since its inception in 2009, the program has provided financial incentives, primarily in local currency, to 125,000 small and medium enterprises (SME) to the tune of over €11 billion. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are granted broader privileges through deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTAs), which allow for access to the common market in most sectors without requiring membership in the European Economic Area (EEA).

A reevaluation of the program was conducted in 2020 and concluded that future development should focus on energy, rule of law, and increased use of the euro by continuing to support EaP states' access to the Single Euro Payment Area. Ensuring stability on the Union's eastern borders has become a top priority, especially given tensions with Russia and between Caucasian countries. Developing the Eastern Partnership and ensuring a cohesive cooperation with the 3SI is key to combat Chinese influence in CEE through the IBIR initiative.

Competition in Africa

In 2018, Africa's population surpassed 1.3 billion, granting it a 16.6% share of total world population.⁴¹ By 2100, that proportion is expected to increase to 39.4%, a drastic rise that demonstrates Africa's immense economic and geopolitical importance.⁴² While it is important to recognize the nuanced economic, cultural, and political situations of each country in the region, it is imperative for the US and the EU to recognize Africa's collective strategic and economic value and meet it with appropriate action.

While Africa is an economically diverse continent, over 33% of its residents are in poverty, the highest percentage in the world.⁴³ One would think that these unparalleled levels of poverty would be met with appropriately robust aid, but Africa receives less Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) per capita than any other developing region (see Figure 2).⁴⁴ Until recently, what investment did exist was largely the result of US and EU donations (especially France, which has historic investment ties with francophone Africa).⁴⁵ However, in the past decade, China has risen to be the largest investor with respect to capital for the continent, contributing more than two times the amount of investment as the US.⁴⁶ These numbers may be slightly deceiving, as the vast majority of Chinese investment in Africa takes the form of project

⁴⁰ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "Joint Communication to The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions." *The European Commission*, The European Union, 18 Mar. 2020,

⁴¹ "Africa Population Growth Rate 1950-2021." *MacroTrends*, 2021, www.macrotrends.net/countries/AFR/africa/population-growth-rate.

⁴² "Africa Population Growth Rate 1950-2021." *MacroTrends*, 2021, www.macrotrends.net/countries/AFR/africa/population-growth-rate.

⁴³ Hamel, Kristofer, et al. "Poverty in Africa Is Now Falling-but Not Fast Enough." *Brookings*, Brookings Institution, 28 Mar. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/03/28/poverty-in-africa-is-now-falling-but-not-fast-enough/.

⁴⁴ García-Herrero, Alicia, et al. "China's Investment in Africa: What the Data Really Says, and the Implications for Europe." *Bruegel*, 22 July 2019, www.bruegel.org/2019/07/chinas-investment-in-africa-what-the-data-really-says-and-the-implications-for-europe/.

⁴⁵ Madden, Payce. "Figure of the Week: Foreign Direct Investment in Africa." *Brookings*, Brookings Institution, 9 Oct. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/10/09/figure-of-the-week-foreign-direct-investment-in-africa/.

⁴⁶ Madden, Payce. "Figure of the Week: Foreign Direct Investment in Africa." *Brookings*, Brookings Institution, 9 Oct. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/10/09/figure-of-the-week-foreign-direct-investment-in-africa/.

finance and lending, but it cannot be ignored that China has positioned itself as a key partner in African development.⁴⁷

In addition to providing funds liberally, China often contributes workers and experts from state-sponsored contractors to help complete infrastructure projects.⁴⁸ This adds significant appeal to opening Chinese partnerships, particularly in severely underdeveloped countries like Sudan and the DRC, allowing Chinese contractors to operate in more than 35 African countries.⁴⁹ These infrastructure projects were largely limited mainly to power generation (especially hydropower) and transportation (especially railways) in the early 2000s. But since the unveiling of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has expanded its offerings, with its state-sponsored tech company, Huawei, jumping to build 5G infrastructure across the Gold Coast, and China Merchants Holdings International investing billions of dollars in port infrastructure in countries like Tanzania and Mozambique.⁵⁰ These investments have helped open up African markets to Chinese companies, allowing China to trade over \$200 billion yearly with the continent and become Africa's biggest trading partner.⁵²




Figure 2: "China's Investment in Africa: What the Data Really Says." Bruegel

However, China's investments are not all in good faith. Having state-owned companies direct development projects, especially in the realm of data and cellular infrastructure, poses a significant security risk considering the country's checkered history with free speech and intellectual property rights.⁵³ Port development contracts have allowed Chinese ships and submarines more friendly territory to refuel and refit, and some have even accused the country of practicing debt-trap diplomacy in its lending

⁴⁷ Herrero, Alicia Garcia. "China's Investments In Africa: What The Data Really Say, And The Implications For Europe." *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 25 July 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/aliciagarciaherrero/2019/07/24/chinas-investments-in-africa-what-the-data-really-says-and-the-implications-for-europe/?sh=75d3efb4661f.

⁴⁸ "10. China's Infrastructure Footprint in Africa - China in Africa - AGE (African Growing Enterprises) File." *Institute of Developing Economies*, Japan External Trade Organization, 2020, www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html#:~:text=China%27s%20Infrastructure%20Footprint%20in%20Africa%20China%20is%20presently.projects%20in%20other%20countries%2C%20especially%20in%20the%20DRC.

⁴⁹ "10. China's Infrastructure Footprint in Africa - China in Africa - AGE (African Growing Enterprises) File." *Institute of Developing Economies*, Japan External Trade Organization, 2020, www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html#:~:text=China%27s%20Infrastructure%20Footprint%20in%20Africa%20China%20is%20presently.projects%20in%20other%20countries%2C%20especially%20in%20the%20DRC.

⁵⁰ Link, Jordan. "Analysis | How Huawei Could Survive Trump." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 10 June 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/10/what-do-we-know-about-huaweis-africa-presence/;

⁵¹ Mead, Nick Van. "China in Africa: Win-Win Development, or a New Colonialism?" *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 31 July 2018, www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/china-in-africa-win-win-development-or-a-new-colonialism.

⁵² Franklin, Lawrence A. "China's 'Debt-Trap' Diplomacy with Third-World Nations." *Gatestone Institute*, 28 Aug. 2020, www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16396/china-debt-trap-diplomacy.

⁵³ Link, Jordan. "Analysis | How Huawei Could Survive Trump." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 10 June 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/10/what-do-we-know-about-huaweis-africa-presence/.

for maritime development, citing Sri Lanka's forced cession of Hambantota Port to China after it failed to pay its project loan debts in 2018.⁵⁴

In addition to economics, China has made targeted efforts to build cultural and political ties with African nations as well. Since 2004, they have established 54 Confucius Institutes across the continent, centers which have garnered criticism for their often shameless promotion of CCP propaganda.⁵⁵ China has also hosted several Beijing Summits of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, with the most recent occurring virtually in June 2020, retitled as the "Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19."⁵⁶ In the summit, Xi Jinping publicly "stressed the enhancing of China-Africa relations," later matching his commitment with major contributions of China's Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine to the continent.⁵⁷ These events, combined with the increased presence of Chinese workers in the region, have helped tighten Chinese cultural ties with the region.

Unfortunately, the US and EU have a lot of catchup to do if they wish to match China's economic and cultural influence. As we have begun to re-engage with Europe, it is essential that a more-involved Africa strategy be a priority for the Biden administration.

Information and Technology

Data

In a report last year, the Congressional Research Service outlined several data challenges with respect to China.⁵⁸ As China has increased foreign investment drastically since the turn of the century, the report highlights the growing difficulties in tracking pertinent flows of money. With significant holes in accuracy, availability, and recency, the CRS asserts that there is "no comprehensive, standardized, or authoritative data... available on Chinese overseas economic activities." Accordingly, many attempts to record data, whether by think tanks, international organizations, agencies, or private groups, have fallen short and carry discrepancies. The CRS attributes this phenomenon as a result of the complexity of Chinese activities, a lack of investment transparency, the use of announced figures rather than actualized investments, offshore rerouting, a broad disaggregation of information, and the practice of investing through state-owned enterprises that evade metrics for strictly private or public vehicles. Indeed, within our research compiling the Chinese Cooperation Index, we confronted many of these same issues, especially on the metric of bilateral foreign direct investment inflows from China and other Chinese economic factors.

⁵⁴ Abi-habib, Maria. "How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 25 June 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html; Franklin, Lawrence A. "China's 'Debt-Trap' Diplomacy with Third-World Nations." *Gatestone Institute*, 28 Aug. 2020, www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16396/china-debt-trap-diplomacy;

⁵⁵ King, Kenneth. "China Will Continue to Back Confucius Institutes in Africa." *Chinadaily.com.cn*, China Daily Paper, 24 Aug. 2018, www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/24/WS5b835c0aa310add14f387e76.html.

⁵⁶ Khan, Iram. "China-Africa Summit Upholds Solidarity against COVID-19." *CGTN*, 18 June 2020, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-06-18/China-Africa-summit-upholds-solidarity-against-COVID-19-Rqb38J1X9u/index.html>.

⁵⁷ Campbell, John. "Vaccine Diplomacy: China and SinoPharm in Africa." *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 Jan. 2021, www.cfr.org/blog/vaccine-diplomacy-china-and-sinopharm-africa.

⁵⁸ Schwarzenberg, Andres B. *Tracking China's Global Economic Activities: Data Challenges and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service, 14 July 2020, <https://fas.org/spp/crs/row/R46302.pdf>.

5G and O-RAN Technologies

Rollout of 5G cellular technology is a further source of conflict with China. Two Chinese companies, Huawei and ZTE, have been among the leaders in the development of the technology. The companies have come under fire for alleged ties to the Chinese government and potential security flaws. The United States instituted a ban on Huawei communications technology following violations to the Iran sanctions and other legal concerns. Meanwhile, both Huawei and ZTE remain key providers of 5G and communications technology in the EU, where they scored contracts with operators in the Netherlands, Sweden, and other member states. Individual nations have taken incoherent approaches to the question of Chinese 5G tech, and the Union has yet to announce a unified policy regarding its usage.

In the strategic region of Africa, Huawei has established deep partnerships instituted in their two decades of operation in the region, cultural intuition, and offerings of reliable products ranging from undersea cabling to mobile phones, alongside attractive state-backed financing not offered by any other business partners.⁵⁹ At the 4th Industrial Revolution SA Digital Economy Summit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa took a stance against the US by coming to the defense of Huawei, citing it a victim of the US-China trade war and stating that “We support a company that is going to take our country, and indeed the world, to better technologies, and that is 5G.”⁶⁰ Kenya, Ethiopia, and other countries across Africa have followed suit with Ramaphosa’s stance.⁵⁷ Indeed, Ramaphosa’s statement is a reflection of the deeply instituted partnership and critical role of Huawei for many African countries’ developmental goals, as the four major telecommunications companies in South Africa (Vodacom, MTN, Telkom, and Cell C) came together to urge Ramaphosa in an official letter to denounce Trump’s ban on Huawei technologies.⁵⁸ With African countries like South Africa expanding 3G and 4G coverage to many of their citizens, the letter argues that the continued growth of these telecommunications sectors is “directly linked to the supply of essential equipment, from Huawei.”⁵⁸

In light of the recent developments in 5G, the US is currently working alongside other countries to develop an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN), which is a “completely disaggregated approach to deploying mobile fronthaul and midhaul networks built entirely on cloud native principles.”⁵⁹ An evolution of the Next Generation RAN (NG-RAN) architecture, O-RAN provides for broadband connectivity through software rather than a large software buildout. This technology not only plays an important role in 5G deployment, but is currently being piloted as a stand alone solution, which would be a cheaper alternative to 5G as well.

Collaboration with China

There are currently several key issues that have the potential for collaboration between China, the US, and the EU. The first of these is cooperation in the realm of global health. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic provided ample opportunities for the US, EU, and China to come together and combat the disease as a combined force. However, the apparent lack of collaboration may have increased the extent of the pandemic and caused unnecessary damage and death.

Another potential area where these three powers could cooperate is countering the spread of terrorism. With peace in the Middle East being a common interest for all parties, a joint effort against

⁵⁹ Prinsloo, Loni. “Huawei Strengthens Its Hold on Africa Despite U.S.-Led Boycott.” *Bloomberg.com*, Bloomberg, 19 Aug. 2020, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-19/china-s-huawei-prospers-in-africa-even-as-europe-asia-join-trump-s-ban.

⁶⁰ “Here It Is – The Letter Vodacom, MTN, Telkom, and Cell C Sent to Ramaphosa.” *MyBroadband*, BusinessTech, 9 July 2019, <https://mybroadband.co.za/news/cellular/312767-here-it-is-the-letter-vodacom-mtn-telkom-and-cell-c-sent-to-ramaphosa.html>.

counterterrorism could provide stability to countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan while fostering camaraderie among the US, EU, and China.⁶¹⁶²

With the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran, these three powers also have mutual interests in cooperating on non-proliferation efforts. The US has already developed its own policies in an attempt to restrict nuclear weapons development in these countries. However, it is imperative that China and the EU join in on these efforts in order to truly make them fruitful.

Climate change is possibly the issue with the most potential for three way collaboration between these powers. Due to the fact that China and the US are the two largest CO2 emitting countries in the world, without their cooperation we will continue to see increased problems because of climate change. With the EU already cooperating with China on climate issues and calling for them to “participate fully in multilateral debt relief efforts within the framework agreed by the G20 and the Paris Club,” it seems that the next step in the fight against climate change would be for the US to join in on these efforts.⁶³ Now that the US has officially rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement, this could provide an avenue for multilateral cooperation between the US, EU, and China.

The Covid-19 Pandemic

Early into the Covid-19 pandemic, China's international reputation was tarnished after rumours emerged that the government had quelled early reports of the novel coronavirus. China has also been largely criticized for overtly spreading disinformation to downplay the emergence of the pandemic, domestically sowing doubt over Western-made vaccines, and censoring information critiquing China's vaccines and response to the outbreak. However, through vaccine exports, China has started to burnish their global reputation and has started expanding its geopolitical influence as a scientific and diplomatic powerhouse.⁶⁴

On the 31st of December 2020, the domestically-produced vaccines of two Chinese companies, the state-owned Sinopharm and private firm Sinovac, were approved for public use. Following this approval, Xi Jinping, China's president, pledged 10 million doses to COVAX, a global initiative to ensure the fair distribution of vaccines, and announced that China's vaccines would be made an accessible and affordable "public good" for developing nations. As of March 7th 2021, China had provided vaccine aid to sixty nine developing countries - largely in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East - and had allegedly sold more than eight hundred million doses to forty three countries abroad.⁶⁵ By filling the large void for vaccine aid among emerging nations, China has extended its soft power and hopes to assuage anger over their lack of openness and perceived mishandling of the initial outbreak in Wuhan.⁶⁶

⁶¹ “OpenRAN (O-RAN) for 5G explained.” *5G Networks*, 23 Nov. 2020, <https://www.5g-networks.net/5g-technology/openran-o-ran-for-5g-explained/>

⁶² Ross, R.S. It's not a cold war: competition and cooperation in US–China relations. *China Int Strategy Rev.* 2, 63–72 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00038-8>

⁶³ “EU-China Leaders' Meeting: Delivering Results by Standing Firm on EU Interests and Values.” *Press Corner*, The European Commission, 30 Dec. 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_2546.

⁶⁴ Mashal, Mujib, and Vivian Yee. “The Newest Diplomatic Currency: Covid-19 Vaccines.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 11 Feb. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/world/asia/vaccine-diplomacy-india-china.html.

⁶⁵ Wee, Sui-lee. “From Asia to Africa, China Promotes Its Vaccines to Win Friends.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 11 Sept. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/business/china-vaccine-diplomacy.html.

⁶⁶ Brunet, Romain. “Covid-19: As the West Competes for Vaccines, China Exports Jabs and Expands Soft Power.” *France 24*, France 24, 30 Jan. 2021, www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210130-covid-19-as-the-west-competes-for-vaccines-china-exports-jabs-and-expands-soft-power.

China's strategy to expand influence in the developing world while vaccines are scarce may prove to be geopolitically successful.⁶⁷ This is because numerous wealthy nations have already hoarded the majority of Western-made vaccines (e.g. Pfizer, Moderna); this has left poorer countries with few options but to seek readily available and alternative sources.⁶⁸ In doing so, China may repair damaged diplomatic ties, capitalise on any potential resentment among developing nations for Western countries, and subsequently gain further political ground in those regions.

Recently, vaccines have started to function as a diplomatic currency. Although China has framed their distribution of vaccines to other countries as altruistic, their generosity should also be viewed as a diplomatic tool to wield leverage over countries in need of support, which Beijing seeks to influence. The US should be wary of this "vaccine diplomacy," as it may further increase developing countries' economic and political dependency on China, as has been the case in Africa and Latin America in recent years. However, Beijing's geopolitical success is highly dependent on the effectiveness and efficiency of their efforts to inoculate developing populations.

Shipment delays, inconsistent disclosures about vaccine efficacy, and a lack of data transparency, could potentially set off backlashes and limit China's diplomacy efforts. This is because Chinese vaccines are reported to have a much lower efficacy rate than those of their Western rivals and peer-reviewed clinical trial data of the Chinese vaccines have not been released publicly. This lack of transparency has already caught a number of foreign nations off guard amid contradicting results of the vaccines' efficacy in those nations. If new variants continue to arise and the efficacy rate is not accurate, this would likely dent China's image because many developing nations will take longer to vanquish the virus and endure hefty economic and social costs. Furthermore, many nations may become frustrated if vaccine shipments are consistently delayed, as has been the case recently with various complaints from officials in Brazil and Turkey.⁶⁹ Thus, China has evolved into a key player in vaccine development and, with national and political interests largely taking precedence over multilateralism, it is imperative that the US and EU are wary of their geopolitical agenda.

Member States

America's relationship with Europe goes beyond simply interacting with the EU as an institution. In developing a comprehensive Europe strategy on China, it is crucial to understand many of the unique relationships individual European states have with China, and how the US might need to navigate more carefully, or leverage them to its advantage.

The China Cooperation Index

In addition to a written report on each country's position with regard to China, we've also developed an index to roughly portray the tendencies of a country to cooperate with China as opposed to cooperating with the United States. Each country's score will be displayed next to their name.

⁶⁷ Girard, Bonnie. "The Politics Behind China's COVID-19 Vaccine Choices." – *The Diplomat*, For The Diplomat, 26 Feb. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/the-politics-behind-chinas-covid-19-vaccine-choices/>.

⁶⁸ "Opinion: China Uses Coronavirus Vaccine to Expand Influence: DW: 30.01.2021." *DW.COM*, www.dw.com/en/opinion-china-uses-coronavirus-vaccine-to-expand-influence/a-56393862.

⁶⁹ Wee, Sui-lee. "China Wanted to Show Off Its Vaccines. It's Backfiring." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 25 Jan. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/business/china-covid-19-vaccine-backlash.html.

The intent of our index is to measure an approximate level of potential for bilateral economic cooperation between each EU member state and China or the United States relative to their peers on a scale from 1 to 10. The data is China-oriented, in that higher values indicate higher potential for cooperation and lower values correspond to higher potential cooperation with the United States by way of lower vulnerability to China. In total, 11 indicators comprise each composite index outcome. These variables were selected across three main pillars: Economics, Western Ties, and Political Health — weighted at 50%, 20%, and 30%, respectively. Economic statecraft remains the dominant and primary vehicle of policy across Europe relative to the US and China (and much of China’s global strategy more generally), but we also recognize the role of political and social currents in strategically shaping the economic landscape and helping determine whether a particular country will be more amenable to a Chinese partnership based on international associations and domestic factors. Generally, we operate under the assumption that being less Western-affiliated, less developed, less democratic, more politically fragile and domestically unstable, and more economically at-need renders a state more inclined to potential cooperation with China as opposed to the United States.




Figure 3: Composite Index Scores, Mapped

Measuring an approximate level of potential for bilateral economic cooperation between each EU member state and China or the United States relative to their peers, on a scale from 1 to 10. Data is China-oriented, in that greater values indicate higher risk for cooperation with China. See appendix for more.

Individual State Reports

France (3.17)

France presents large potential for cooperation with the United States against Chinese influence, in particular on the African continent. Due to France's historical ties to Africa, it remains actively engaged in former colonial countries. It retains significant soft power in the region, through linguistic and cultural ties, for instance through the Francophonie. France also maintains financial power in Africa in business ties through French multinational corporations, as well as the CFA Franc guaranteed by France used in the Financial Community of Africa (albeit soon defunct). France boasts access to hard power through its military and has approximately 6,000 troops deployed in the Sahel region to combat terrorism through Operation Barkhane.⁷⁰ France is also the only remaining nuclear power in the European Union, following the departure of the United Kingdom. It is a key supporter of African organizations such as the G5 Sahel. Furthermore, France's president Emmanuel Macron has been critical of debt restructuring programs for African nations, fearful that they will simply become indebted to China.⁷¹ He is a major proponent of the European Union and supports increasing political and economic cooperation within the Union. Overall, France will prove to be a key player in a US-Europe cooperation framework against China, due to its soft and hard power capabilities in battleground regions.




Figure 3: "Map of French Military Bases in the Sahel." The Economist

Germany (3.6)

Berlin will be a crucial player in the competition against China for two main reasons: its status as a leading nation in the EU, and the German automotive industry's strong ties to China.

Its presidency in the European Commission, through Ursula von der Leyen, its presidency over the European Council which it lost to Portugal at the beginning of this year, and Angela Merkel's seniority over other European Leaders have given Germany unmatched say in European policy, with only France coming close to rivaling it.⁷² This influence has granted Germany the power to influence much of European policy, from passing the CAI⁷³ to organizing the landmark EU recovery fund in mid-2020.⁷⁴ This same influence paves the way for the US to increase its cooperation with the EU, as courting Germany will be a key strategy.

The second of Germany's unique factors in the great game against China is the massive role of its automotive industry in foreign policy. About 10% of German GDP is from the automotive industry and

⁷⁰ "Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel." *Operation Barkhane - Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel*, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/operation_barkhane.

⁷¹ "Macron Veut Que L'Afrique Arrête De S'endetter Massivement Auprès De La Chine." *Agence Ecofin*, 22 Feb. 2021, www.agenceecofin.com/multimedia/2202-85444-macron-veut-que-l-afrique-arrete-de-s-endetter-massivement-aupres-de-la-chine

⁷² "Germany Is Doomed to Lead Europe." *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 2020, www.economist.com/europe/2020/06/25/germany-is-doomed-to-lead-europe.

⁷³ Fallon, Theresa. "The Strategic Implications of the China-EU Investment Deal." *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 5 Jan. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-strategic-implications-of-the-china-eu-investment-deal/>

⁷⁴ Jennen, Birgit. "Here's Who Gets What in the EU's 750 Billion-Euro Recovery Deal." *Bloomberg.com*, Bloomberg, 2020, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-26/here-s-who-gets-what-in-the-eu-s-750-billion-euro-recovery-deal.

its suppliers.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the main German automakers control about 85% of the market share for the global luxury car market.⁷⁶ The automotive industry's contributions to the German and global economy give them great sway over the actions of the nation, both directly (through pressure) and indirectly (through the value they add, which the German government must weigh when crafting foreign policy). A main beneficiary of the CAI agreement, the German auto industry was also a key reason that its representatives in the EU government were its primary drivers.⁷⁷

Clearly, an incentive to the German automotive industry is an incentive to the German government, and due to its sway, by extension great parts of the EU.

Poland (6.7)

Poland is poised to become a strategic gateway between Europe and Asia, standing to profit from strong ties with both the West and China. While simultaneously a member of NATO, the OECD, and the EU, Poland has nevertheless fostered a close relationship with China since joining the Belt and Road. Despite its Western economic and political memberships, its vulnerabilities are found elsewhere. Poland has the fifth lowest Democracy Index score in the EU, joined by other low ranking CEE nations. It is ranked second-worst on the Fragile State Index on the Human Rights subscore, second only to Hungary. Poland is likewise among the “dirtiest” seven on the Corruption Perceptions Index.

In 2015, Poland became one of the first European countries to sign a BRI Memorandum of Understanding with China.⁷⁸ After entering a strategic partnership in 2016, President Duda declared his hopes “that Poland will become China’s veritable gateway to Europe, not only in symbolic but also in economic terms, and that joint investment projects will be launched.”⁷⁹

Poland is economically strategic given its domination of Eastern European agricultural exports to China (followed second by Hungary) and the potential for rail transit between continents.⁸⁰ In a 2021 phone conversation between Presidents Xi and Duda, China celebrated a bilateral record high for trips and freight volume over the last year through the China-Europe freight train.⁸¹

Despite a close relationship, it appears the Chinese reality has fallen short of some Polish expectations — a similar phenomenon across parts of CEE in recent years. After the rift between some national leaders at the 17+1 Summit, President Duda asserted Poland was “dissatisfied” with the rate of access to Chinese markets and desired to lift “administrative restrictions of agri-food goods from

⁷⁵Rostek-Buetti, Andreas. “Germany's Car Industry Struggles with Transformation amid Coronavirus Crisis.” *DW.COM*, Deutsche Welle, 2020, www.dw.com/en/what-germanys-car-summit-hopes-to-achieve/a-54841263#:~:text=The%20mixture%20is%20especially%20toxic,is%20made%20by%20the%20industry.

⁷⁶Wilmot, Stephen. “China Keeps Germany's Car Makers in the Fast Lane.” *The Wall Street Journal*, Dow Jones & Company, 20 May 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/china-keeps-germanys-car-makers-in-the-fast-lane-11589964602.

⁷⁷“Cynicism Explains a Flawed New EU-China Commercial Pact.” *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 9 Jan. 2021, <https://www.economist.com/china/2021/01/07/cynicism-explains-a-flawed-new-eu-china-commercial-pact>

⁷⁸Jie, Shan. “Chinese Ambassador Details Deepening Ties with Poland.” *Global Times*, 25, Dec. 2018, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1133513.shtml.

⁷⁹“Poland and China Sign Universal Strategic Partnership Pact.” *Polskie Radio Dla Zagranicy*, Polskie Radio S.A., 2016, <https://archiwum.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/257974,Poland-and-China-sign-universal-strategic-partnership-pact>

⁸⁰Lau, Stuart. “China's Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the Cold Shoulder.” *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 9 Feb. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/.

⁸¹“President Xi Lauds China-Poland Relations, Eyes to Deepen Ties with CEEC.” *CGTN News*, CGTN, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-03-01/President-Xi-holds-phone-talks-with-Polish-President-Duda-YhyPdVY2Tm/index.html>.

Poland.”⁸² However, he also expressed his optimism and assured Xi of continued and deepened cooperation between the two countries.⁸³

Italy (5.73)

As the first G7 country to officially join China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2019, Italy has recently increased their focus on making deals with China. Viewing China as an important strategic partner, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio has stated that Italy and China need to forge closer ties.⁸⁴ While still acknowledging the importance of maintaining their military alliance with the United States, Italy would like to expand their engagement with Chinese trade, finance, and industrial cooperation. Since the pandemic has severely hampered the Italian economy and left it in a fragile state, several Italian politicians now view China as a potential solution to these recent economic troubles.⁸⁵

Hungary (6.29)

Like Poland, its Eastern European neighbor, Hungary too has felt the pull of Chinese influence over the past decade, meeting it largely with enthusiasm and reciprocation.

Of course, China’s economic power has been the primary driving force in this elevated relationship between the two nations. Hoping to reap the benefits of increased economic investment and protect against a repeat of the 2008-2009 Great Recession (which substantially affected Hungary's economy), Hungary was the first member of the EU to sign onto China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative.⁸⁶ In addition, Hungary was the first European Union state to purchase China’s Sinopharm Coronavirus vaccine, further connecting the two countries’ interests.⁸⁷ These ties have grown so much that in February 2021, Qi Dayu, Beijing’s chief diplomat in Hungary, hailed the two countries’ embrace, citing how “Hungary’s eastward opening[... to] China’s Belt and Road Initiative” have caused “bilateral relations [to enter] the best period in history.”⁸⁸

But economic incentives have not been the only forces of attraction in this newly-kindled relationship; cultural and political ties have brought the countries together as well. Hungary was recently reclassified as a “hybrid regime” by the Freedom House democracy, a decline that has its roots in the 2010 election of Viktor Orbán, a strong-man and staunch supporter of Russia’s Vladimir Putin.⁸⁹ Orbán

⁸² Lau, Stuart. “China's Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the Cold Shoulder.” *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 9 Feb. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/.

⁸³ “Prezydent: Żywimy Oczekiwanie, Że Współpraca w Ramach 17+1 Zacznie Przynosić Bardziej Wymierne Rezultaty.” *TVN24*, TVN24, 9 Feb. 2021, <https://tvn24.pl/swiat/polska-chiny-prezydent-andrzej-duda-o-wspolpracy-gospodarczej-szczyt-171-5015027>.

⁸⁴ Amante, Angelo. “Italy Says China a Key Strategic Partner, despite U.S. Concerns.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 25 Aug. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-italy/italy-says-china-a-key-strategic-partner-despite-u-s-concerns-idUSKBN25L1LR.

⁸⁵ Kuo, Mercy A. “Italy's China Card in EU-US Relations.” *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 14 Dec. 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/italys-china-card-in-eu-us-relations/>.

⁸⁶ Macri, John. “How Hungary's Path Leads to China's Belt and Road.” *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 11 Apr. 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/how-hungarys-path-leads-to-chinas-belt-and-road/>.

⁸⁷ Spike, Justin. “Chinese Vaccine Arrives in Hungary, a First in the EU.” *Medical Xpress*, Science X Network, 16 Feb. 2021, <https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-02-chinese-vaccine-hungary-eu.html>.

⁸⁸ “Ambassador Hails Historically Good China-Hungary Relation.” *CGTN News*, CGTN, 2021, <https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2021-02-28/Ambassador-hails-historically-good-China-Hungary-relations-YeqYiKQkAU/index.html>.

⁸⁹ Csécséi, Nóra. “Freedom House: Hungary Is No Longer a Democracy but a 'Hybrid Regime'.” *Daily News Hungary*, Daily News Hungary, 8 May 2020, <https://dailynewshungary.com/freedom-house-hungary-is-no-longer-a-democracy-but-a-hybrid-regime/#:~:text=In%20its%20most%20recent%20report,%20%E2%80%9CFreedom%20House%E2%80%9D%20has,is%20the%20recently-adopted%20Hungarian%20Coronavirus%20Protection%20Act%20>.

has since promoted anti-EU campaigns and spearheaded constitutional changes which have further distanced Hungary from the EU,⁹⁰ which have only recently resulted in the suspension of his EU voting rights.⁹¹ He has also expressed a desire to increase Hungary's ties with Turkey, an increasingly autocratic state under Recep Erdoğan.⁹² Orbán's outreach to other authoritarian regimes led him to Xi Jinping's China, which now finds itself in the fold of Hungary's autocratic partners.

With Hungary not only being on the periphery of the geographic and governmental EU, but also having a vested interest in Chinese economic and political cooperation, they are at a substantial risk of slipping away.

Greece (6.74)

Greece is situated on the eastern periphery of Europe, making it geographically inclined to be an economic partner of China similar to Hungary or Poland. However, unlike their landlocked neighbors, Greece (as described by PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis) is "a nation of seafarers," controlling nearly "25% of the world's oceangoing merchant fleet."⁹³ This unique status has made Greece a prime target for Chinese investment, with the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) planning on spending \$3 billion on port infrastructure in the coming five years.⁹⁴ This spending has helped Greece immensely in the last decade, as the country was put into several debt and hardship during the financial crisis of 2008.⁹⁵ Since COSCO's initial investment in 2010, shipping output at Greece's main port, Piraeus, has risen from 685,000 a year to nearly five million in 2018 alone.⁹⁶

The Greek government, still reeling from the debt crisis, has almost universally embraced this Chinese economic involvement, with the liberal Syriza government signing a memorandum of understanding for the BRI in 2018, and the conservative New Democracy government unfreezing \$67 million of previously barred Chinese investments in the fall of 2019.⁹⁷

But Greece has also sought to strengthen its political ties with China. At first, this was largely out of necessity for bargaining leverage during the Greek debt crisis in 2016, when Greece "vetoed a joint EU statement calling on China to respect the International Law of the Sea."⁹⁸ The liberal Syriza government

⁹⁰ "Q&A: Hungary's Controversial Constitutional Changes." *BBC News*, BBC, 11 Mar. 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21748878.

⁹¹ Scheppele, Kim Lane. "Europe's Largest Party Suspends Its Resident Autocrat-for Now." *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, 28 Mar. 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2019-03-28/europes-largest-party-suspends-its-resident-autocrat-now.

⁹² "Hungary's Orban Praises Erdoğan for Turkey's Stability." *Ahval News*, Ahval, 29 July 2018, <https://ahvalnews.com/hungary/hungarys-orban-praises-erdogan-turkeys-stability>.

⁹³ Psaropoulos, John. "Greece and China Hail Strategic Partnership." *Business and Economy News*, Al Jazeera, 11 Nov. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/11/greece-and-china-hail-strategic-partnership-as-us-and-eu-look-on/.

⁹⁴ Reuters Staff. "China, Greece Agree to Push Ahead with COSCO's Piraeus Port Investment." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 11 Nov. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-china-idUSKBN1XL1KC.

⁹⁵ "The Greek Economy Is Recovering. Improving Debt Sustainability, Tackling Poverty and Boosting Investment Are Vital to Sustaining the Positive Momentum." *OECD*, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 30 Apr. 2018, www.oecd.org/newsroom/the-greek-economy-is-recovering-improving-debt-sustainability-tackling-poverty-and-boosting-investment-are-vital-to-sustaining-the-positive-momentum.htm.

⁹⁶ Psaropoulos, John. "Greece and China Hail Strategic Partnership, as US and EU Look On." *Business and Economy News*, Al Jazeera, 11 Nov. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/11/greece-and-china-hail-strategic-partnership-as-us-and-eu-look-on/.

⁹⁷ Psaropoulos, John. "Greece and China Hail Strategic Partnership, as US and EU Look On." *Business and Economy News*, Al Jazeera, 11 Nov. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/11/greece-and-china-hail-strategic-partnership-as-us-and-eu-look-on/.

⁹⁸ Emmott, Robin. "EU's Statement on South China Sea Reflects Divisions." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 15 July 2016, www.reuters.com/article/southchinesea-ruling-eu/eus-statement-on-south-china-sea-reflects-divisions-idUSL8N1A130Y.

hoped that this action, in addition to its calls for Chinese lending, would counterbalance Europe's control of Greek debt (Europe held roughly two-thirds of Greek debt at the time).⁹⁹ Since then, however, Greece has continued to turn a blind eye to China, blocking an EU statement on Chinese speech restriction at the UN in 2017.¹⁰⁰

However, Greece is still aligned with the US and EU; as Plamen Tonchev, the head of the Asia unit at the Institute of International Economic Relations, said, "Greece needs the US and EU[...] China doesn't have a role to play in this political equation."¹⁰¹ However, without proper attention, there is a substantial risk of Greece slipping away and further embracing the CCP.

Portugal (4.72)

Historically speaking, China and Portugal have been close trading partners, with oceangoing Portuguese traders being vital assets for facilitating Chinese regional and international trade starting in the 1400s. Xi Jinping has used these historic ties in his rhetoric to justify increased Chinese involvement in Portugal, but these are hardly the only motivations for why these two countries have strengthened their economic and political ties in the past two decades.¹⁰²

Like Greece, Portugal plays a vital role in Mediterranean sea trade. Its critical location on the Iberian Peninsula has made its Port of Sines a critical gateway for linking oceanic and land trade in Europe, so much that more than 5,000 container trains depart the port every year with imported goods.¹⁰³ China has focused funds for the BRI at the Port of Sines, but it has also targeted investment in other infrastructure areas, including Portugal's energy sector. In 2011, China's Three Gorges power company bought 21% of the stake in EDP, Portugal's largest power supplier, and has since been in a bid to acquire more of the company.¹⁰⁴

However, Portugal has not embraced China culturally or politically in the way that its Eastern European counterparts have. Portugal remains a strong democracy, with the Freedom House ranking it 10th globally in democratic freedoms (above the UK, Germany, and the United States), so they can likely be counted on to take a moral stance against China's human rights abuses.¹⁰⁵

The Netherlands (3.26)

In recent years, Sino-Dutch relations have remained strong and seen growing connections in trade and investment. This can be largely attributed to the Netherlands' strong bilateral trade relationship with

⁹⁹ Emmott, Robin. "EU's Statement on South China Sea Reflects Divisions." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 15 July 2016, www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-ruling-eu/eus-statement-on-south-china-sea-reflects-divisions-idUSL8N1A130Y.

¹⁰⁰ Emmott, Robin, and Angeliki Koutantou. "Greece Blocks EU Statement on China Human Rights at U.N." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 18 June 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-un-rights/greece-blocks-eu-statement-on-china-human-rights-at-u-n-idUSKBN1990FP.

¹⁰¹ Psaropoulos, John. "Greece and China Hail Strategic Partnership, as US and EU Look On." *Business and Economy News*, Al Jazeera, 11 Nov. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/11/greece-and-china-hail-strategic-partnership-as-us-and-eu-look-on/.

¹⁰² Bugge, Axel. "China Wants to Strengthen Partnership with Portugal: Xi." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 2 Dec. 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-portugal-china-idUSKBN1O10JQ.

¹⁰³ "China-Portugal Ties: Port of Sines Looks for Role in Belt and Road Initiative." *CGTN News*, CGTN, 7 Dec. 2018, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3445444e7a494464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/share_p.html.

¹⁰⁴ "Deal Profile: China Three Gorges Buys EDP Stake for \$3.51 Billion." *The Wall Street Journal*, Dow Jones & Company, 23 Dec. 2011, www.wsj.com/articles/BL-DLB-35999.

¹⁰⁵ Port, Len. "Democracy and Freedom in Portugal." *Portugal Resident*, Portugal Resident Open Media, 19 Nov. 2020, www.portugalresident.com/democracy-and-freedom-in-portugal/.

China, key role as a major European logistics hub, and cooperation under the Chinese-proposed Belt and Road Initiative which seeks to promote free, transparent, and fair trade across international borders.¹⁰⁶

Amsterdam Schiphol Airport and the port of Rotterdam, the third busiest airport and largest sea port in Europe respectively, makes the Netherlands a major gateway to Europe for many Asian countries, including China. This is evidenced by the Netherlands being the second largest exporter of goods to China within the European Union.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, China is one of the Netherlands' major investment partners because its rapidly growing markets and large R&D budgets provide extensive opportunities for Dutch companies. As of May 2018, the Netherlands was the largest EU investor in China with Dutch foreign direct investment into China reaching US\$700 million.¹⁰⁸

However, in February 2021, the Dutch government also became the first European Union country to recognize the Chinese government's treatment of its Uyghur Muslim minority as genocide, which may negatively impact Dutch-Chinese relations. China also recently raised concerns that the Netherlands politicized their bilateral relations by, following pressure from the U.S. government, withholding the license ASML, a near monopolist in the Netherlands' lithography industry, needed to export goods essential to compete in the burgeoning semiconductor industry to China.¹⁰⁹ Also, increasingly mindful of growing security issues, industrial espionage, and unfair trade practices, the Netherlands hopes to reduce their dependence on China in key sectors while protecting business interests and trade relations.¹¹⁰ Nonetheless, the Netherlands remains a strategic partner for China and can help further enhance political trust and pragmatic cooperation between China and the European Union.

Serbia (N/A)¹¹¹

An official candidate for accession to the EU since 2012, Serbia plays a unique role in the Western Balkans in that it serves as a beachhead for the expansion of Chinese influence in the region.

A public opinion poll conducted in 2018 revealed that 56% of Serbians hold favorable views on China compared with 27% towards the EU.¹¹² Furthermore, 39.9% of Serbians believe that China is the largest contributor to foreign aid when it is actually the European

EU Far Outspends China on Foreign Aid to Serbia

4 out of 10 Serbians think China is Serbia's biggest foreign aid donor, but the EU is by far the largest donor in Serbia and China is not even in the top four.




Figure 4: "Political Relations Between the Republic of Serbia and the European Union," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia

¹⁰⁶ Three Things to Know about China-Netherlands Relations." *CGTN News*, CGTN, 14 Oct. 2018, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414e7845444f7a457a6333566d54/share_p.html.

¹⁰⁷ Netherlands, Statistics. "Rise in Domestic Exports to China." *Statistics Netherlands*, <https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2020/26/rise-in-domestic-exports-to-china>. Accessed 4 Apr. 2021.

¹⁰⁸ Fujino, Lauren Eiko. "China-Netherlands Trade and Investment Opportunities Are Growing." *China Briefing News*, 8 Nov. 2018, <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-netherlands-trade-investment-strong-new-opportunities/>.

¹⁰⁹ "Chinese Ambassador Warns Dutch Government against Restricting ASML Supplies." *Reuters*, 15 Jan. 2020. [www.reuters.com, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-asml-china-idUSKBN1ZE1Z8](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-asml-china-idUSKBN1ZE1Z8).

¹¹⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The Netherlands and China: a new balance." *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 2019.

¹¹¹ Serbia is not an EU member state and was thus not included in the index due to data consistency concerns

¹¹² "Political Relations Between the Republic of Serbia and the European Union," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/foreign-policy/eu/political-relations-between-the-republic-of-serbia-and-the-european-union>; National Democratic Institute, *Western Balkans Between East and West: Public Opinion Research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia* (Washington DC: 2018), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Download%20Report_1.pdf.

Union, followed by Germany, the US, and the UN.¹¹³ Serbia favors alignment with China over the US and EU primarily out of strategic and political interests.

Serbia and China support each other's geostrategic goals; Serbia maintains the one China principle on the issue of Taiwan and expresses support for the Chinese human rights violations against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and China does not recognize Kosovo's independence.

The fundamental cause for Serbia's partnership with China, however, is the compatibility between their political institutions. Serbia is categorized as a Hybrid Regime by the Freedom House democracy index and has been in decline largely due to increases in high level corruption. Chinese support plays a key role in solidifying the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Serbian government, using the promise of economic prosperity due to loans framed as gifts by state-influenced media to boost popular support while circumventing any of the democratic contingencies that come with EU and OECD support.¹¹⁴ It has also opened Belgrade to implementation of Huawei's "Safe City" project, which will strengthen Beijing's influence over Serbia while simultaneously strengthening Serbia's surveillance apparatus, and therefore its influence over its own people.¹¹⁵

However, Serbia is also aware of this threat, and is keen on balancing China's influence in order to maintain its autonomy, giving the United States the opportunity to offer itself as a counterbalance, as it did with the signing of an MoU targeting Huawei along with 13 of the 17+1 countries, including Serbia and the aforementioned Poland.¹¹⁶ This gives Washington and Brussels leverage, leverage that they could use to replace China as Serbia's benefactor.

A PATH FORWARD

The European Union

In order to counter China's rise on the world stage, the US must engage it in multiple different theaters: diplomatic, economic, and technological, among others. However, before the US can compete with China effectively, it must ensure that it builds a unified front with other major democratic powers around the world who have a stake in the preservation of a US-led world order. The largest and most influential of America's allies are the unions of the states of Western Europe, through the EU, NATO, and economic partnerships such as the OECD. First and foremost amongst its actions against China, the US must endeavor to repair its relationships with its allies, chief among them the EU, and build renewed trust with them in order to command a unified front to navigate the complex issue of confrontation with China.

¹¹³ Svetlana Bozic Kraincanic and Mila Durdevic, "Infografike," Radio Slobodna Evropa, June 4, 2020, www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ko-su-najveci-strani-donatori-srbije/30652284.html It is important to note, however, that this order was reversed in an earlier poll in 2020 in which people ranked the European Union first (28 percent), Russia second (27 percent), and China third (20 percent) in donor size. See International Republican Institute, *Western Balkans Regional Poll* (Washington, DC: 2020), https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/final_wb_poll_deck_for_publishing_1.pdf

¹¹⁴ Conley, Heather A., et al. *Political Impacts*. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020, pp. 1–9, *Becoming a Chinese Client State: THE CASE OF SERBIA*, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26534.4. Accessed 8 Mar. 2021.

¹¹⁵ Stojkovski, Bojan. "Big Brother Comes to Belgrade." *Foreign Policy*, The Slate Group, 18 June 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/big-brother-comes-to-belgrade-huawei-china-facial-recognition-vucic/>.

¹¹⁶ Brînză, Andreea. "How China's 17+1 Became a Zombie Mechanism." *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Group, 10 Feb. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/how-chinas-171-became-a-zombie-mechanism/>.

Treaties and Trade

In order to remedy the growing economic divisions between the US and the EU, the US should immediately repeal the WTO sanctioned trade tariffs imposed on the EU in 2019 under the Trump administration.¹¹⁷ Although they may have been justified, in the long run they will do more harm than good because they decouple the US from the EU and encourage them to act more independently, especially in economic policy which is the most crucial battleground against China.

A Democratic Free Trade Zone (DFTZ)

Furthermore, the US should explore opening its economy to the EU even further under a free trade agreement in order to encourage economic cooperation and increase net total GDP between the two, which would increase the total capacity of the alliance even if growth is uneven. Eventually, this could be expanded into a larger “Democratic Free Trade Zone,” opened to countries which meet certain criteria such as individual and economic freedoms, including several countries which the US already has a free trade agreement with, such as Canada, Korea, and Australia.¹¹⁸ (see Figure 1 for a map of existing US FTA’s and potential members of the DFTZ based on The Economist’s Democracy Index).¹¹⁹

Recognizing the political obstacles of such a plan given recent push backs on globalization around the world, especially in developed economies, the Democratic FTZ should be viewed more as a long term goal that is implemented step by step, whenever politically feasible, perhaps initially founded between just the US and EU, and then slowly expanded. This would clearly take longer than 4-8 years but if the Biden administration could put the initial framework in place, then it could set the stage for future administrations to facilitate expansion towards the ultimate goal of a widespread FTZ for democracies around the world to exchange goods, ideas, and people freely, interconnecting and strengthening their democratic institutions in the process.

The US should capitalize on the immense leverage that it holds with the promise of entry to a FTZ with the US and EU in order to entice nations to comply with the requirements of entry (potentially: individual/internet freedoms, market openness, democracy index, etc.). Furthermore, instead of using Trump’s tariffs on the EU as a bargaining chip in order to extract a concession, such as blocking the CAI for example, the US should simply remove them as a gesture of good will. Practical doctrine would dictate that America leverage everything it can, but if the US wants to rebuild foundational *trust* with Europe and its leaders, treating them like an opposing party which it must extract a concession from is no way to do so. Instead, a gesture of good will proves to skeptical European leaders that they can once again look to America not as a competitor, but a genuine friend and partner that looks out for their well being.

¹¹⁷ Kinsman, Matthew R, and Kathleen M Murphy. “Biden Administration Maintains Status Quo on EU Product Tariffs (At Least for Now).” *The National Law Review*, The National Law Forum, 15 Feb. 2021, www.natlawreview.com/article/biden-administration-maintains-status-quo-eu-product-tariffs-least-now#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20the%20Trump%20administration,Scotch%20whisky%20and%20Spanish%20olives.

¹¹⁸ “Free Trade Agreements.” *ustr.gov*, Office of the United States Trade Representative, <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements>.

¹¹⁹ Illustrated with mapchart.net based on information from <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements> and The Economist’s Democracy Index: <https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/>

This Democratic Free Trade Zone (DFTZ), would strengthen the democratic traditions of its existing members, but in order to encourage their growth in potential candidates, such as nations with between a 6.0 and 7.0 score on the Economist's Democracy Index, the coalition of democracies needs a mechanism to extend its reach, cultivate relationships with increasingly like-minded governments, and finance the development of democratic societies around the world.




Figure 5: Potential Members of the DFTZ, Illustrated with mapchart.net

Expanding Influence Abroad

Leveraging the World Bank

In order for the US and EU to adequately challenge China's economic power and develop a pro-democracy narrative, they must engage the entire world. While engaging democratically like-minded countries in the Democratic Free Trade Zone is beneficial, employing existing institutions with large memberships like The World Bank Group can encourage the development of democratic institutions and values outside of the DFTZ.

Therefore, the US and EU should use their voting leverage in the WBG to reclassify China as a developed nation (as opposed to a "developing" nation) and cease its yearly \$1 billion grant from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹²⁰ Curbing this cash flow will have a limited impact on the Chinese economy, but it would expose Beijing's manipulative practices to a greater degree on the world stage, discouraging economic engagement with the country and incentivizing movement toward the DFTZ. Since this action is largely for PR, it is important that it be conducted not only with transparency and multilateral cooperation, but also vocal global promotion.

¹²⁰ Lawder, David. "World Bank Adopts \$1 Billion-plus Annual China Lending Plan over U.S. Objections." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 6 Dec. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-china-idUSKBN1YA038.

With their immense voting power in the bank, the US and EU could also try to redefine the World Bank Group, setting requirements of democratic self-determination and clean human rights records in order for countries to receive funding (much like entrance into the DFTZ). However, we do not advise this. The World Bank serves a sole objective: to reduce poverty across the world.¹²¹ While we desire to promote the US and EU's democratic agenda, we do not want to hinder the WBG's humanitarian mission by further politicizing the organization. Rather, creating a new funding institution, rooted in advancing democracy, is a preferable alternative.

The Democracy Bank Initiative

In October 2014, Xi Jinping announced the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, an institution founded as a financing wing for the Belt and Road Initiative.¹²² Since its founding, the CCP-backed bank has gained over 103 members, financed billions of dollars of BRI investment, and achieved the highest credit rating from the Fitch Group, S&P Global Ratings, and Moody's.¹²³ In short, the Chinese have developed a strong institution through which to finance their Belt and Road Initiative. If the US and EU want to effectively counter the BRI, they must do the same.

Therefore, we propose the creation of a bank for the Democratic Free Trade Zone, a global Democracy Bank, or "DemBank" for short. Upon meeting the standards of self-determination and democratic freedoms required to enter the DFTZ, member countries could access the resources of the DemBank, which will be tasked with three main responsibilities:

- To provide direct funding for development infrastructure, much like the World Bank, with a particular focus in power production, transportation, healthcare, and technology.
- To facilitate trade agreements between democratic nations and private firms.
- To manage an education wing of the bank, which can provide experts in education, technical training, and other forms of human capital development to member countries in need.

These responsibilities would directly counter Chinese BRI investment targets. However, while these incentives might discourage countries from siding with AIIB, the US and EU can only guarantee the DemBank's advantage if they dedicate enough funding to rival the assets of the AIIB. The AIIB was conceived from a starting capital of \$100 billion.¹²⁴ We would advise the US, EU, and other DFTZ countries to *at least* double this amount, with an ideal goal of achieving \$250 billion in initial capital. This robust investment would jump-start the DemBank and immediately launch it to the forefront of global financial institutions.

Central and Eastern Europe

Central and Eastern European will be critical to protecting America's European interests from China. Already more vulnerable compared to its Western counterparts within our Chinese Cooperation Index, many CEE nations lack the same robustness in democratic institutions, economic liberalism, and infrastructure development — making the area a plum target for a Chinese "backdoor" into Europe.

¹²¹ "Who We Are." *The World Bank*, World Bank Group, www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are.

¹²² "About AIIB." *AIIB*, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2020, www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html.

¹²³ "AIIB Receives Third Triple-A Credit Rating - News." *AIIB*, 2017, www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2017/AIIB-Receives-Third-Triple-A-Credit-Rating.html.

¹²⁴ "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) - Overview, Structure." *Corporate Finance Institute*, CFI, 6 Feb. 2021, <https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib/>.

However, over the last couple of years, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and the reconsolidation of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has experienced sizable success in the region.¹²⁵

We recommend President Biden continue bolstering the work and devoting resources to the CEE partnership between the 3SI and DFC. The joint initiative is ripe for expansion, given strong bipartisan support amid the 2020 election cycle¹²⁶ and as Chinese projects initiated earlier in the decade have fallen short of expectations.¹²⁷ Likewise, the EU has been actively investing in the CEE region through the Eastern Partnership¹²⁸ and other initiatives like Cohesion Funds, the European Investment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹²⁹

However, while both fronts of European and American-led initiatives have yielded a degree of success, they suffer from a lack of strategic cohesion and unified visibility within a popular narrative. Unlike the Belt and Road Initiative, which maintains a distinct, recognizable brand and consolidated vision, the array of Western initiatives possesses neither of these traits and remains obscure. In response, we recommend the formation of a strategic, popular, and organizationally efficient “bundling” of the initiatives above — united under a common US-EU vision. The United States can spearhead this process by first strengthening the DFC and 3SI and packaging its development efforts clearly to the American people, policymakers, and the international community while coordinating with the EU counterpart programs.

Competition in Africa

Between its exploding population and burgeoning economic growth, Africa is critical to the US and EU’s current and future interests. As previously mentioned, Africa is an economically diverse continent. However, the vast majority of its citizens still live in poverty, making Africa a perfect ground for the DemBank to have the greatest positive impact.¹³⁰

Sub-Saharan Africa is a largely developing region, with its political institutions and traditions currently at their most malleable. Therefore, this area should be the primary target of US, EU, and DemBank foreign direct investment. In particular, they should focus their funds in power production, seaports, and 5G technology, as these areas have seen heightened levels of Chinese FDI. Also, by gaining a larger stake in African port development, we can also mitigate the security threat of PLA Navy expansion.

In addition, we recommend that the DemBank subsidize the expansion of domestic corporate ventures to the continent. Beijing’s state-owned corporate structure has allowed for well-streamlined and well-coordinated investment in Africa to offer prices impossible to achieve in a labor-respecting free

¹²⁵ “Tallinn Summit Marks Significant Progress in Three Seas Initiative.” *Atlantic Council*, Atlantic Council, 3 Dec. 2020, www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/tallinn-summit-marks-significant-progress-in-three-seas-initiative/.

¹²⁶ “Kaptur, Kinzinger Resolution Supporting Three Seas Initiative Passes Committee.” *Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur*, 1 Oct. 2020, <https://kaptur.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/kaptur-kinzinger-resolution-supporting-three-seas-initiative-passes>.

¹²⁷ Lau, Stuart. “China’s Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the Cold Shoulder.” *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 9 Feb. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/.

¹²⁸ High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. “Joint Communication to The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions.” *The European Commission*, The European Union, 18 Mar. 2020,

¹²⁹ Mardell, Jacob, et al. “Responding to China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Two Steps for a European Strategy.” *MERICs*, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 26 June 2018, <https://merics.org/en/analysis/responding-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-two-steps-european-strategy>.

¹³⁰ Patel, Nirav. “Figure of the Week: Understanding Poverty in Africa.” *Brookings*, Brookings Institute, 21 Nov. 2018, www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/11/21/figure-of-the-week-understanding-poverty-in-africa/.

market.¹³¹ However, properly-incentivized and subsidized US and EU corporations can ethically match their economic weight and provide African states with a viable alternative to shady Chinese investment projects.

Finally, in order to counter the pull of Confucius Centers and the importation of Chinese workers, we recommend that the US and EU heavily invest in education. Most notably, they should encourage their universities to partner with “sister universities” throughout the continent, set up campuses throughout the region, and expand their recruitment of African exchange students, allowing them to foster the untapped human capital of the region without creating a brain drain on the continent.

Furthermore, Europe maintains linguistic ties to its former colonies on the continent. Funded by the DemBank, investment in language learning centers could serve as a soft-power tool for the democratic coalition. Specifically, the US should tap its relationships, mainly with France and Portugal, but also potentially with Italy and Spain, to strike these investment deals through existing political structures such as the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). Strengthening the linguistic ties between Africa and Europe will not only result in increased infrastructure development as schools and roads are constructed to facilitate these learning programs, but also ensure long term engagement as the next generation of African politicians, business leaders, and scientists grow up speaking languages that put them in cooperation with their counterparts north of the Mediterranean.

By providing this multifaceted investment to the continent, the US and the EU can once again reassert themselves as integral partners to countries of the African continent.

Information and Technology

Data

We recommend, with inspiration from the CRS, for the US to collaborate with the EU to develop a comprehensive and authoritative center for harmonized Chinese economic data. Other options include advising President Biden to establish a statistical office or program directed to compiling “current information on international capital flows and other information related to international investment, public procurement, and export and investment promotion, financing, and insurance by U.S., Chinese, and other major economic actors.”¹³² As China’s role in the world economy strengthens — as well as its statecraft through economic means — it is essential for policymakers everywhere to formulate assumptions and decisions driven by complete and accurate data.

5G and O-RAN Technologies

As Huawei is one of only four global suppliers of telecommunications technologies alongside Ericsson, Nokia, and ZTE (another Chinese company), collaboration with Ericsson, Nokia, and other European telecom companies is the most viable action plan for countering Huawei and ZTE in Africa.¹³³

¹³¹ Radu, Sintia. “China Is Hurting Innovation, Not Helping It.” *U.S. News & World Report*, U.S. News & World Report, 7 Jan. 2020, www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2020-01-07/chinas-unfair-trade-practices-hurt-global-innovation-report-says.

¹³² Schwarzenberg, Andres B. *Tracking China’s Global Economic Activities: Data Challenges and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service, 14 July 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46302.pdf>.

¹³³ “Here It Is – The Letter Vodacom, MTN, Telkom, and Cell C Sent to Ramaphosa.” *MyBroadband*, BusinessTech, 9 July 2019, <https://mybroadband.co.za/news/cellular/312767-here-it-is-the-letter-vodacom-mtn-telkom-and-cell-c-sent-to-ramaphosa.html>.

There are two options of technology and business competition with China in Africa: one with a focus on existing areas of Huawei prominence like South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the other focus on newly burgeoning economies and tech consumer bases. With Ericsson's experience operating in Africa and knowledge of African consumer markets, the next critical step is to match Huawei in technology offerings on the front of reliable and accessible 5G. Such technologies need to be subsidized by possible DemBank subsidies and loans which offer a more favorable return on investment than grant aid. Though we acknowledge the difficulty of completely matching China's state-backed financing, our strategy is a combination of bolstering financing through strategic federal funding efforts to get closer to more competitive rates, alongside the guarantee of data security and favorable standing with the US and other countries who have signed on to Trump's ban.

Beyond leveraging collaboration with European telecom companies to actively compete with Huawei, it is imperative to have strategic and central support from Washington for R&D to further increase the facility of 5G deployment, lower the cost of such technologies, promote O-RAN research, and develop interoperability standards between such equipment. This entails expediting the implementation of the Utilizing Strategic Allied (USA) Telecommunications Act, a new bipartisan bill introduced in November of 2020.¹³⁴ It would require the Federal Communications Commission to "set aside \$750 million in spectrum auction proceeds" to support development of 5G technologies, deployment equipment, and O-RAN R&D.¹³⁴ O-RAN must be a development priority as this open architecture model allows various vendors to enter the market at different stages of 5G network deployment to offer their specific network components. Additionally, it is crucial to promote US-Nato collaboration on security of systems, which entails interoperability research, communication on a set of standards that is safe, and prevention of operation on standards that are sub-optimal and require later investment for change.

Collaboration with China

Although there are many ways that we can work with the EU in order to counter the rise of China, it is also wise that we explore options to collaborate with China. As the two major world powers, it is important that the US and China collaborate in order to tackle some of society's most pressing problems. A joint effort between the US, China, and the EU could help mend the strained relationships between these countries.

The first way that the US, EU, and China could collaborate is in the realm of nuclear cooperation. As the main nuclear powers in today's society, a nuclear disarmament deal between the US, Russia, France, and China could be a stepping stone towards greater cooperation in the future. On its own, the US is unlikely to engage in nuclear disarmament with China, as doing so would allow Russia to become the dominant nuclear power. Thus, this solution would have to incorporate Russia as well and possibly France, given its relatively large nuclear arsenal. In fact, on March 5, 2020, China, France, Russia, the US, and the UK all reiterated their commitment to the pursuit of good faith negotiations on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament in a joint statement.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Hill, Kelly. "Senate bill would put \$1.25B in play for 5G O-RAN R&D, security." *rcrwireless.com*, 15 Jan. 2020, <https://www.rcrwireless.com/20200115/5g/senate-bill-would-put-1-25b-in-play-for-5g-o-ran-security-rd>

¹³⁵ "Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, UK and US on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (10 Mar. 20)." *France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs*, Ministère De L'Europe Et Des Affaires Étrangères, 10 Mar. 2020, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-

Another issue which has potential for future collaboration between the US, EU, and China is climate change. Now that the US has officially rejoined the Paris Agreement, we have the opportunity to cooperate with China on a number of climate related issues. As the two largest carbon dioxide emitting countries, China and the US could lead the efforts on these issues in a shared attempt to reach carbon neutrality by the middle of the century.¹³⁶ Additionally, with the EU participating in the Paris Agreement as well, this could provide an opportunity for multinational cooperation between the three parties while at the same time solving one of society's biggest problems.

Moreover, the US should consider revitalizing and revising former climate agreements with China in an attempt to reestablish cooperation between the two powers. With climate change being one of the foundational pillars of US-China cooperation during the Obama administration, the US should consider reinstating some of these Obama-era climate agreements. Examples of these agreements include the “US-China Ten-Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and the Environment, the US-China Climate Change Working Group (CCWG) created under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and the US-China Clean Energy Research Center”.¹³⁷ These agreements all have the potential to restart cooperation between the US and China.

COVID-19 and Pandemics

A US-EU effort to spearhead an international coalition to foster multilateralism to end the pandemic is essential. The organization could establish transparency rules, ensure the fair distribution of vaccine aid, and arrange for an international pipeline of vaccine production. Given the success of the existing collaboration on vaccine development between US and EU companies, most notably through the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, this effort should be expanded upon through a broader vaccine sharing program. As the US and EU reach herd immunity, they should dedicate substantial amounts of US and EU vaccines (Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca, Johnson and Johnson, and potentially Sanofi) to assist developing countries in their efforts to inoculate their population. This initiative could establish the US as a global leader and combat China's recent vaccine diplomacy push, emphasizing US and EU vaccines over Chinese ones.

Such an international coalition will also serve as a central pillar for preventing, predicting, and fighting future epidemics. There is a crucial need for a more structured international pipeline of PPE, masks, and other healthcare equipment in order to ensure rapid epidemic response and early efforts for containment. Following the example of USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) which has been highly accurate in predicting nearly every major famine in food insecure regions, it is also imperative to channel funding for research efforts to develop an analogous model for epidemic prediction, which is already underway with initial efforts from researchers involved in FEWS NET creation, as well as from other organizations. The immense predictability of FEWS NET may be attributed to the incorporation of nontraditional sources of information not typically leveraged in famine prediction; for epidemic prediction, this could look like longitudinal monitoring of doctors’ sentiments to

[disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/article/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-china-france-russia-uk-and-us-on](https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Biden_China_CGEP_Commentary_v3.pdf).

¹³⁶ Barnes, Aimee, et al. “How the US and China Could Renew Cooperation on Climate Change.” *Center on Global Energy Policy*, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Dec. 2020, www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Biden_China_CGEP_Commentary_v3.pdf.

¹³⁷ Barnes, Aimee, et al. “How the US and China Could Renew Cooperation on Climate Change.” *Center on Global Energy Policy*, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Dec. 2020, www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Biden_China_CGEP_Commentary_v3.pdf.

screen for early circulation of diseases, metadata on transportation and trade, and (as proposed by the Global Immunological Observatory, an initiative by a Harvard professor), routine screening for antibody types in standard blood tests conducted around the world.¹³⁸

Furthermore, the US and the EU should redouble their commitment to international organizations such as the WHO instead of abandoning them. This way, they can use their vast diplomatic influence to guarantee transparency and accountability in the face of Chinese disinformation and self-serving political pressure.¹³⁹

Member States

France

An effective approach to encouraging cooperation with France vis à vis China must mobilize France's strengths in soft and hard power, in particular on the African continent. On a soft power side, this would require strengthening of cultural ties through the francophone community. A particular area of promise is that of education: the United States could consider working together with France to further develop research and training centers in Africa, in particular through elite universities. Such a partnership would allow the United States and Europe to expand technological and academic expertise in Africa, while promoting a Western model for development. This could significantly counteract disruptive Chinese efforts in the region.

On the hard power side, France has demonstrated that it is able and willing to engage its military. It has increased spending and expanded training exercises in recent years¹⁴⁰. The United States should opt to expand the pursuit of joint training exercises with France, demonstrating our commitment to act together in counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. This would reiterate the intention of ensuring safety on the African continent and beyond, and disincentivize China from making excessively provocative moves on the continent.

Germany

Under the proposed democratic FTZ, the German automotive industry poses a threat to its counterpart in the United States, which employs the majority of its workers in the same midwestern states that were crucial in both the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. It would be unwise for President Biden's administration to risk the key yet vulnerable region's employment. However, Biden also needs Germany to craft a Europe strategy that will make it past the drawing board, so he must be careful with how he opens up to it. Germany remains a strong ally nonetheless and keeping their trust, economically and militarily, will be absolutely key to continued cooperation with Europe as a whole, especially in the European Union.

President Biden should therefore reverse the military withdrawal from US military bases in Germany unless the DoD or intelligence agencies determine a withdrawal to be tactically advantageous. Former President Trump was most likely using it as a simple political bargaining chip and, therefore, the action should be reversed.

¹³⁸ Mina MJ, Metcalf CJE, McDermott AB, Douek DC, Farrar J, Grenfell BT. A Global Immunological Observatory to meet a time of pandemics. *Elife*. 2020 Jun 8;9:e58989. doi: 10.7554/eLife.58989. PMID: 32510329; PMCID: PMC7292646.

¹³⁹ Campbell, Charlie, and Amy Gunia. "Can We Believe Any of China's Coronavirus Numbers?" *Time*, Time, 1 Apr. 2020, <https://time.com/5813628/china-coronavirus-statistics-wuhan/>.

¹⁴⁰ "The French Armed Forces Are Planning for High-Intensity War." *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 28 Mar. 2021, www.economist.com/europe/2021/03/28/the-french-armed-forces-are-planning-for-high-intensity-war.

With reference to the German auto-industry, Biden’s agenda should focus on attempting to strike an investment deal with the auto manufacturers to entice operations in the states, the midwest especially. This may harm American car manufacturers, but ultimately, the employment of the voters of the region is the most important factor to consider.

Poland

Unlike most of Western Europe, whose policy conversations are largely driven more by a doctrine of “strategic autonomy” and economic negotiation than security interest, Poland relies more heavily on military considerations relative to its Western peers. With an increasingly aggressive Russia, organizations like NATO will assume an increasingly important role in shaping Poland’s priorities. Thus, we recommend that it is in the American interest to solidify relations with Poland against China from a targeted security angle. As we recommend a continuation of exerting pressure on Poland to restrict Huawei and other modes of Chinese influence,¹⁴¹ it will be critical to frame China’s perspective as parallel to Russia’s authoritarianism — and that both adversaries will benefit from a decreased role of the United States in the region and increased Chinese presence, ultimately endangering Poland.

Economically, with Chinese-sponsored transit through Poland developing, we also recommend seeking opportunities through the DFC or 3SI to partner with EU initiatives to sponsor similar rail and transportation projects to counter China’s view of Poland as a “gateway into Europe.”¹⁴² Additionally, given competing agricultural interests between Poland and farmers in Western Europe, we recommend exploring channels through which the United States can 1) open our markets for Polish food exports and 2) mediate trade dialogue across the continent. As China offers to continue deepening Polish access to their food markets, engaging Poland with Western economies through facilitating friendly trade will be important to counter Chinese economic statecraft.¹⁴³

Italy

With Italy forging closer economic ties to China, it is imperative that the US reminds Italy of its “long-standing military and economic cooperation” with the US.¹⁴⁴ Although Italy views trade with China as a way to revitalize its fragile post-pandemic economy, it is also important that they continue to recognize the massive benefits of economic and military assistance from the US. Since Italy and the US have been able to maintain positive relations even in the wake of Italy’s increased cooperation with China, it seems there is potential for the US to further strengthen their ties with Italy at China’s expense.

One especially important issue to address is that the United States must continue to pressure Italy to reject 5G technology from Huawei. With Italy recently vetoing a deal between telecommunications groups Fastweb and Huawei, it seems that Italy realizes the national security threats that come intertwined

¹⁴¹ Paszak, Paweł. “Poland-China Relations in 2021: Current State and Prospects.” *Warsaw Institute*, Warsaw Institute, 5 Feb. 2021, <https://warsawinstitute.org/poland-china-relations-2021-current-state-prospects/>.

¹⁴² “Poland and China Sign Universal Strategic Partnership Pact.” *Polskie Radio Dla Zagranicy*, Polskie Radio S.A., 20 June 2016, <https://archiwum.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/257974,Poland-and-China-sign-universal-strategic-partnership-pact>.

¹⁴³ Lau, Stuart. “China’s Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the Cold Shoulder.” *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 9 Feb. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/.

¹⁴⁴ de Maio, Giovanna. “Why the US-Italy Relationship Matters.” *Atlantic Council*, Atlantic Council, 26 Jan. 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/why-the-us-italy-relationship-matters/.

with a Huawei 5G deal.¹⁴⁵ In the future, the US must ensure that Italy continues to reject such deals and should instead offer Italy a deal to use US 5G service.

Hungary

Between Hungary's authoritarian tendencies under strongman Viktor Orbán and its recent economic alignments with China, Hungary has the potential to serve as a choke point for future Chinese influence in Eastern Europe.

It is imperative, therefore, that the US and EU assert themselves to not only remind Hungary of its primary trading partners in Europe, but also the numerous advantages they have as a democracy in the European Union. The EU's suspension of Orbán's voting rights as retaliation for his heated anti-EU rhetoric was a step in the right direction, but further steps should be taken. The US and EU should meet future autocratic developments in Hungary with economic disincentives and clearly articulate that such measures are the result of Viktor Orbán's consolidation of power. This, of course, would have to be done carefully as to not give Beijing another door into Hungary, but it would clearly rebuke the autocratic patterns that have driven these two countries together. If done well, these economic pressures could help reinvigorate popular resistance in Hungary and facilitate a rebuilding of its democratic institutions.

Greece

Despite some of its worrying behaviors and the drama surrounding the Greek debt crisis, Greece is still very much an integral part of the EU. However, Greece's increased economic involvement with China has led it to be morally complacent in several instances. This demands a response.

The US and other members of the EU should urge Greece to join in its unilateral statements of solidarity against Chinese human rights abuses. While Greece can work with China on economic projects, these interests should not supersede the values of free speech, free religion, and free press that Greece shares with the US and EU.

In addition, the US and other EU member-states should look for opportunities to expand their trading and investment relationship with Greece whenever possible to reduce the allure of Chinese economic influence.

Portugal

Portugal is a strong democracy and an integral part of the EU. While they have felt the pull of China's economic might and entered into more collaborative economic partnerships with Xi, they have not compromised their democratic values out of fear of economic retaliation. Their connections to Chinese state-owned power may be troubling, but Portugal can be counted on to remain faithful to the democracies of the EU and US.

The US and EU, therefore, would be wise to promote many aspects of Portugal's approach to Chinese relations. With its maritime economy, Portugal can serve as a powerful example to other EU Mediterranean countries like Greece and Italy who have felt similar economic pressures from China.

¹⁴⁵ Fonte, Giuseppe, and Elvira Pollina. "Italy Vetoes 5G Deal between Fastweb and China's Huawei: Sources." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 23 Oct. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-italy-5g/italy-vetoes-5g-deal-between-fastweb-and-chinas-huawei-sources-idUSKBN2782A5

The Netherlands

The extensive bilateral relations between the Netherlands and China can help enhance political trust and pragmatic cooperation between China, the European Union and the US. With China's increasing international influence, it remains important that the Netherlands maintains Sino-Dutch relations to protect the interests of the nation, the EU, and the US. They should continue work with China to solve global issues (through international organisations e.g. the UN, WTO, WIPO); however, they should avoid unintentionally helping China with technological transfers and knowledge. The Netherlands should also promote China taking on a leading global role on climate change by inducing it to raise its national climate targets and tackle unfair trade practices such as intellectual property theft and unwanted transfer of technology.¹⁴⁶

Serbia

Serbia's role as a beachhead for Chinese investment in CEE must be addressed, and with its recent show of resistance after standing China up at 17+1 and signing the American MoU on Huawei, the US and EU have an opportunity to insert themselves as a counterbalance.

Recognizing that they already contribute so much to Serbia's total FDI, the US and EU should enforce stronger conditions with regards to political freedoms and institutions in an attempt to weaken president Alexander Vučić's monopoly of power, with the end goal of free and fair elections. This action would strike at the source of Serbia's partnership with China and be the most effective, if not the only way of countering Beijing's growing influence in the country.

APPENDIX

Methodology of the Chinese Cooperation Index

Summary

The intent of our index is to measure an approximate level of potential for bilateral economic cooperation between each EU member state and China or the United States relative to their peers on a scale from 1 to 10. The data is China-oriented, in that higher values indicate higher potential for cooperation and lower values correspond to higher potential cooperation with the United States by way of lower vulnerability to China. In total, 11 indicators comprise each composite index outcome. These variables were selected across three main pillars: Economics, Western Ties, and Political Health — weighted at 50%, 20%, and 30%, respectively. Economic statecraft remains the dominant and primary vehicle of policy across Europe relative to the US and China (and much of China's global strategy more generally), but we also recognize the role of political and social currents in strategically shaping the economic landscape and helping determine whether a particular country will be more amenable to a Chinese partnership based on international associations and domestic factors. Generally, we operate under the assumption that being less Western-affiliated, less developed, less democratic, more politically fragile

¹⁴⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The Netherlands and China: A New Balance." *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 2019, <https://www.government.nl/documents/policy-notes/2019/05/15/china-strategy-the-netherlands--china-a-new-balance>.

and domestically unstable, and more economically at-need renders a state more inclined to potential cooperation with China as opposed to the United States.

The Indicators

The 11 indicators selected fell under the three categories of Economics, Western Ties, and Political Health. Economics as a block was weighted at 50% to establish an economically dominant index outcome and baseline for which other non-economic outcomes could then shape. It holds three indicators:

- 1) The difference between each country's United States and Chinese WTO Trade Intensity Index Score from 2018, the latest data available.¹⁴⁷ More positive difference values indicate a higher trade intensity with China relative to trade with the world and more negative values indicate higher trade intensity with the United States relative to trade with the world.

- 2) The percentage level of growth in stock values of Chinese investment in each country, comparing the total stock from the time period 2005-2012 and the full time period 2005-2020 with data obtained from the American Enterprise Institute Chinese Global Investment Tracker (CGIT).¹⁴⁸ The dividing year 2012 was selected because it split the interval in two equal time frames, the first 16+1 Summit convened the same year, and the formal announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative followed in 2013. Since the CGIT incorporates primarily large transactions, some EU states lacked Chinese investment data over the initial time period from 2005-2012. In an attempt to roughly fill in some of the missing data, we located smaller Chinese FDI investments within those countries over the interval using data from UNCTAD to supplement accordingly.¹⁴⁹ After obtaining raw growth percentages for each state, we sorted each country into four Investment Growth Tiers with an assigned value 1-4. A score of 1 indicates "Modest Growth" below 100%, 2 indicates "Sizable Growth" between 100% and 750%, 3 indicates "Heavy Growth" at 750% or above, and 4 indicates "Rapid Induction" representing recently targeted countries — those with either a zero or near-zero case over 2005-2012 and accelerating to heavy investment levels after 2012 through 2020.

- 3) Affiliation of a state with the Belt and Road Initiative, or specifically whether a state has signed a BRI Memorandum of Understanding or has committed to a BRI project.

Western Ties holds three indicators. The first two are membership in NATO and membership in OECD. Values of zero were assigned to membership in the respective organizations while values of 1 were attributed to absences of respective membership. Western Ties holds the least weight in the index as a category, since every country examined already falls within the EU, and that economically many countries in Europe are likely to cooperate with China under the basis of "strategic autonomy" and market concerns independent of membership in democratic or security-based networks. However, while simply being in NATO or the OECD will not preclude a country from China in its own right — although it can

¹⁴⁷ *Trade Indicators*, The World Bank, 2010, https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/Content/Utilities/e1.trade_indicators.htm.

¹⁴⁸ *China Global Investment Tracker*, AEI, 2021, www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000618.

¹⁴⁹ "Croatia FDI Data." *Unctad.org*, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/webdiaeia2014d3_HRV.pdf.

be helpful in the interest of marrying security and economic interests (see Baltic States) — we believe the absence of NATO or OECD membership increases the likelihood of vulnerability to China. The third indicator incorporates United Nations voting record data to rank every nation in terms of their strength of correlating alignment with China over the period 2004 to 2019.¹⁵⁰

Political Health holds five indicators. The first three are drawn from fragility sub-indicators within the 2020 Fragile States Index (FSI): human rights, external intervention, and economic decline.¹⁵¹

The FSI Economic Decline indicator was included within Political Health as opposed to our Economics pillar because of the context of its use in originally contributing to “fragility” in the FDI index, which we believe helps measure domestic vulnerability in key areas relevant to China within the broader report. The final two indicators are drawn from the Corruption Perceptions Index¹⁵² and *The Economist’s* Democracy Index.¹⁵³ Specific backgrounds and methodology for the respective indices detailed above can be located in the footnotes and attached sourcing.

Construction

Our approach began with inspiration from the USAID and their willingness to share best practices in index construction.¹⁵⁴ In order to standardize the individual indicators across countries, we opted for converting each variable’s data via z-scores, which conveys how distant from the mean a particular data point is. Each z-score was weighted at the pillar, sub-pillar, and indicator level via multiplication to a constant, and then added across variables to distill a final composite value. More positive values imply a greater potential for cooperation with China and more negative implies less potential for cooperation with China and more so with the United States. As a result, our outcomes are not “absolute” per se, in that fundamentally the scores for each country are relative to its peers in the EU. This being said, a country could theoretically be “close” to China and receive a negative z-score in our data, but this still implies the country is less at-risk than its fellow EU peers. The question of weighting individual indicators within sub-pillars, sub-pillars, and pillars overall to particular degrees necessarily included a mix of qualitative assessments on behalf of our research team in order to create a model to reflect the inherently qualitative nature of much political decision-making, our collective analytical intuition, and to maintain simplicity. For a more intuitive understanding of the final index outcome for each country, we converted the z-score composites to percentiles and then divided them by ten to achieve a relative ranked scale from 1-10. Shown below is a visual representation of our variable construction:

¹⁵⁰ Voeten, Erik; Strezhnev, Anton; Bailey, Michael, 2009, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUOZ>, Harvard Dataverse, V17, UNF:6:o5OiqHLeXMiv9Q8w8+3sVw== [fileUNF]

¹⁵¹ “Fragility in the World 2020.” *Fragile States Index*, The Fund for Peace, 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.

¹⁵² *Corruption Perceptions Index 2020*, Transparency International, 2021, www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nz.

¹⁵³ “Democracy Index 2020.” *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, The Economist Group, 2021, https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/democracy-index-2020.pdf?mkt_tok=NzUzLVJJUS00MzgAAAF7lfQ02ISDNObYWXQOOoPWI7qCchxESkMJyWjDVXOLOwgP74u9OU5cYG04TT09ZnQbt2L8i-hidTzLF75yq2sTC_G438ySdD4Bhez8X9W5UYiEm7A.

¹⁵⁴ “Composite Indicators: An Introduction to Their Development and Use.” *USAID Learning Lab*, USAID, 17 Sept. 2019, <https://usaidlearninglab.org/library/composite-indicators-introduction-their-development-and-use>.




Figure 7: Variable Construction

Visualization




Figure 8: Composite Index Scores, Mapped

Measuring an approximate level of potential for bilateral economic cooperation between each EU member state and China or the United States relative to their peers, on a scale from 1 to 10. Data is China-oriented, in that greater values indicate higher risk for cooperation with China.




Figure 9: Composite Index Scores

Displaying the composite index value for each EU country on a scale from 1 to 10, relative to their fellow members.




Figure 10: Composite Z-Scores

Arranging index outcomes using composite z-scores before transformation into final composite index scores (see Methodology). Visualizing the data centered around 0 in this light reveals more prominently which countries are at highest and lowest risk to Chinese cooperation relative to their peers — and which are most ambivalent.

Works Cited

- Abi-habib, Maria. "How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 25 June 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html.
- "About AIIB." *AIIB*, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2020, www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html.
- "About the IMF." *IMF*, International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org/en/About.
- "Africa Population Growth Rate 1950-2021." *MacroTrends*, 2021, www.macrotrends.net/countries/AFR/africa/population-growth-rate.
- "AIIB Receives Third Triple-A Credit Rating - News." *AIIB*, 2017, www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2017/AIIB-Receives-Third-Triple-A-Credit-Rating.html.
- Amante, Angelo. "Italy Says China a Key Strategic Partner, despite U.S. Concerns." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 25 Aug. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-italy/italy-says-china-a-key-strategic-partner-despite-u-s-concerns-idUSKBN25L1LR.
- "Ambassador Hails Historically Good China-Hungary Relation." *CGTN News*, CGTN, 2021, <https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2021-02-28/Ambassador-hails-historically-good-China-Hungary-relations-YeqYiKQkAU/index.html>.
- "America's Global Image." *Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project*, Pew Research Center, 24 July 2020, www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/23/1-americas-global-image/.
- "Annual Report 2020." *World Bank*, 2020, www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report.
- "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) - Overview, Structure." *Corporate Finance Institute*, CFI, 6 Feb. 2021, <https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib/>.
- Barnes, Aimee, et al. "How the US and China Could Renew Cooperation on Climate Change." *Center on Global Energy Policy*, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Dec. 2020, www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Biden_China_CGEP_Commentary_v3.pdf.
- Beaubien, Jason. "Flush With Cash, China Continues to Borrow Billions From The World Bank." *NPR*, NPR, 31 Jan. 2019, www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/01/31/689960866/flush-with-cash-china-continues-to-borrow-billions-from-world-bank.

- “The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944.” *U.S. Department of State*, U.S. Department of State, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.htm>.
- Brînză, Andreea. “How China's 17+1 Became a Zombie Mechanism.” *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Group, 10 Feb. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/how-chinas-171-became-a-zombie-mechanism/>.
- Brunet, Romain. “Covid-19: As the West Competes for Vaccines, China Exports Jobs and Expands Soft Power.” *France 24*, France 24, 30 Jan. 2021, www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210130-covid-19-as-the-west-competes-for-vaccines-china-exports-jobs-and-expands-soft-power.
- Bugge, Axel. “China Wants to Strengthen Partnership with Portugal: Xi.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 2 Dec. 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-portugal-china-idUSKBN1O10JQ.
- Campbell, Charlie, and Amy Gunia. “Can We Believe Any of China's Coronavirus Numbers?” *Time*, Time, 1 Apr. 2020, <https://time.com/5813628/china-coronavirus-statistics-wuhan/>.
- Campbell, John. “Vaccine Diplomacy: China and SinoPharm in Africa.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 Jan. 2021, www.cfr.org/blog/vaccine-diplomacy-china-and-sinopharm-africa.
- Cave, Danielle, Leibold, James, Munro, Kelsey, Ruser, Nathan, and Xiuzhong Xu, Vicky. “Uyghurs For Sale.” *ASPI*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1 Mar. 2020, www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale
- Chazan, Yigal. “Comment: US Signals Support for European Infrastructure Overhaul.” *International Investment*, Incisive Media, 12 Nov. 2020, www.internationalinvestment.net/opinion/4023185/comment-us-signals-support-european-infrastructure-overhaul.
- “China's Infrastructure Footprint in Africa - China in Africa - AGE (African Growing Enterprises) File.” *Institute of Developing Economies*, Japan External Trade Organization, 2020, www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html#:~:text=China%27s%20Infrastructure%20Footprint%20in%20Africa%20China%20is%20presently,projects%20in%20other%20countries%2C%20especially%20in%20the%20DRC.
- China Global Investment Tracker*, AEI, 2021, www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000618.
- “China-Portugal Ties: Port of Sines Looks for Role in Belt and Road Initiative.” *CGTN News*, CGTN, 7 Dec. 2018, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3445444e7a494464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/share_p.html.
- “Chinese Ambassador Warns Dutch Government against Restricting ASML Supplies.” *Reuters*, 15 Jan. 2020. *www.reuters.com*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-asml-china-idUSKBN1ZE1Z8>.

“Composite Indicators: An Introduction to Their Development and Use.” *USAID Learning Lab*, USAID, 17 Sept. 2019, <https://usaidlearninglab.org/library/composite-indicators-introduction-their-development-and-use>.

Corruption Perceptions Index 2020, Transparency International, 2021, www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nz.

“Croatia FDI Data.” *Unctad.org*, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/webdiaeia2014d3_HRV.pdf.

Csécsei, Nóra. “Freedom House: Hungary Is No Longer a Democracy but a 'Hybrid Regime'.” *Daily News Hungary*, Daily News Hungary, 8 May 2020, <https://dailynewshungary.com/freedom-house-hungary-is-no-longer-a-democracy-but-a-hybrid-regime/#:~:text=In%20its%20most%20recent%20report,%20%E2%80%9CFreedom%20House%E2%80%9D%20has,is%20the%20recently-adopted%20Hungarian%20Coronavirus%20Protection%20Act%20>.

“Cynicism Explains a Flawed New EU-China Commercial Pact.” *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 9 Jan. 2021, <https://www.economist.com/china/2021/01/07/cynicism-explains-a-flawed-new-eu-china-commercial-pact>.

“Deal Profile: China Three Gorges Buys EDP Stake for \$3.51 Billion.” *The Wall Street Journal*, Dow Jones & Company, 23 Dec. 2011, www.wsj.com/articles/BL-DLB-35999.

“Democracy Index 2020.” *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, The Economist Group, 2021, https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/democracy-index-2020.pdf?mkt_tok=NzUzLVJJUS00MzgAAAF7lfQ02ISDNObYWXQOOpWI7qCchxESkMJyWjDVXOLOwgP74u9OU5cYG04TT09ZNQbt2L8i-hidTzLF75yq2sTC_G438ySdD4Bhez8X9W5UYiEm7A.

Dempsey, Judy. “Judy Asks: Is Europe Ready to Work With the United States on China?” *Carnegie Europe*, Carnegie Europe, 10 Dec. 2020, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/83425>.

Dollar, David. “The AIIB and the 'One Belt, One Road'.” *Brookings*, The Brookings Institution, 7 Sept. 2017, www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/.

Emmott, Robin, and Angeliki Koutantou. “Greece Blocks EU Statement on China Human Rights at U.N.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 18 June 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-un-rights/greece-blocks-eu-statement-on-china-human-rights-at-u-n-idUSKBN1990FP.

Emmott, Robin. “EU's Statement on South China Sea Reflects Divisions.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 15 July 2016, www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-ruling-eu/eus-statement-on-south-china-sea-reflects-divisions-idUSL8N1A130Y.

- “EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI).” *Trade*, The European Commission, 22 Jan. 2021, <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2237>.
- “EU-China Leaders' Meeting: Delivering Results by Standing Firm on EU Interests and Values.” *Press Corner*, The European Commission, 30 Dec. 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_2546.
- Fallon, Theresa. “The Strategic Implications of the China-EU Investment Deal.” *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 5 Jan. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-strategic-implications-of-the-china-eu-investment-deal/>
- Fallor, Evan. “US-EU Trade Deal Seen Remote Even If Biden Occupies White House in 2021.” *Market Intelligence*, S&P Global, 19 Oct. 2020, www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/us-eu-trade-deal-seen-remote-even-if-biden-occupies-white-house-in-2021-60606405.
- Fonte, Giuseppe, and Elvira Pollina. “Italy Vetoes 5G Deal between Fastweb and China's Huawei: Sources.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 23 Oct. 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-italy-5g/italy-vetoes-5g-deal-between-fastweb-and-chinas-huawei-sources-idUSKBN2782A5.
- “Fragility in the World 2020.” *Fragile States Index*, The Fund for Peace, 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.
- Franklin, Lawrence A. “China's 'Debt-Trap' Diplomacy with Third-World Nations.” *Gatestone Institute*, 28 Aug. 2020, www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16396/china-debt-trap-diplomacy.
- “Free Trade Agreements.” *Ustr.gov*, Office of the United States Trade Representative, <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements>.
- “The French Armed Forces Are Planning for High-Intensity War.” *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 28 Mar. 2021, www.economist.com/europe/2021/03/28/the-french-armed-forces-are-planning-for-high-intensity-war.
- Fujino, Lauren Eiko. “China-Netherlands Trade and Investment Opportunities Are Growing.” *China Briefing News*, 8 Nov. 2018, <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-netherlands-trade-investment-strong-new-opportunities/>.
- García-Herrero, Alicia, et al. “China's Investment in Africa: What the Data Really Says, and the Implications for Europe.” *Bruegel*, 22 July 2019, www.bruegel.org/2019/07/chinas-investment-in-africa-what-the-data-really-says-and-the-implications-for-europe/.
- “Germany Is Doomed to Lead Europe.” *The Economist*, The Economist Newspaper, 2020, www.economist.com/europe/2020/06/25/germany-is-doomed-to-lead-europe.

- Girard, Bonnie. "The Politics Behind China's COVID-19 Vaccine Choices." – *The Diplomat*, For The Diplomat, 26 Feb. 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/the-politics-behind-chinas-covid-19-vaccine-choices/>.
- "The Greek Economy Is Recovering. Improving Debt Sustainability, Tackling Poverty and Boosting Investment Are Vital to Sustaining the Positive Momentum." *OECD*, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 30 Apr. 2018, www.oecd.org/newsroom/the-greek-economy-is-recovering-improving-debt-sustainability-tackling-poverty-and-boosting-investment-are-vital-to-sustaining-the-positive-momentum.htm.
- Hamel, Kristofer, et al. "Poverty in Africa Is Now Falling-but Not Fast Enough." *Brookings*, Brookings Institution, 28 Mar. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/03/28/poverty-in-africa-is-now-falling-but-not-fast-enough/.
- "Here It Is – The Letter Vodacom, MTN, Telkom, and Cell C Sent to Ramaphosa." *MyBroadband*, BusinessTech, 9 July 2019, <https://mybroadband.co.za/news/cellular/312767-here-it-is-the-letter-vodacom-mtn-telkom-and-cell-c-sent-to-ramaphosa.html>.
- Herrero, Alicia Garcia. "China's Investments In Africa: What The Data Really Say, And The Implications For Europe." *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 25 July 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/aliciagarciaherrero/2019/07/24/chinas-investments-in-africa-what-the-data-really-says-and-the-implications-for-europe/?sh=75d3efb4661f.
- High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "Joint Communication to The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions." *The European Commission*, The European Union, 18 Mar. 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/default/files/joint_communication_on_the_eap_policy_beyond_2020.pdf.
- Hillman, Jonathan E. "How Big Is China's Belt and Road?" *CSIS*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3 Apr. 2018, www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road.
- Huang, Kristin. "Size of China's Navy May Be Closing Gap on US Fleet but What Can the PLA Do with Just One Overseas Naval Base?" *The Star Online*, Star Media Group Berhad, 16 Mar. 2021, www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2021/03/16/size-of-chinas-navy-may-be-closing-gap-on-us-fleet-but-what-can-the-pla-do-with-just-one-overseas-naval-base.
- "Hungary's Orban Praises Erdoğan for Turkey's Stability." *Ahval News*, Ahval, 29 July 2018, <https://ahvalnews.com/hungary/hungarys-orban-praises-erdogan-turkeys-stability>.
- "Iran Students Refuse to Walk over US and Israeli Flags." *BBC News*, BBC, 12 Jan. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-51084619.

- Jennen, Birgit. "Here's Who Gets What in the EU's 750 Billion-Euro Recovery Deal." *Bloomberg.com*, Bloomberg, 2020, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-26/here-s-who-gets-what-in-the-eu-s-750-billion-euro-recovery-deal.
- Jie, Shan. "Chinese Ambassador Details Deepening Ties with Poland." *Global Times*, 2018, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1133513.shtml.
- "Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, UK and US on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (10 Mar. 20)." *France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs*, Ministère De L'Europe Et Des Affaires Étrangères, 10 Mar. 2020, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/article/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-china-france-russia-uk-and-us-on.
- "Kaptur, Kinzinger Resolution Supporting Three Seas Initiative Passes Committee." *Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur*, 1 Oct. 2020, <https://kaptur.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/kaptur-kinzinger-resolution-supporting-three-seas-initiative-passes>.
- "Key Elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment." *European Commission Press Corner*, EU, 30 Dec. 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2542
- Khan, Iram. "China-Africa Summit Upholds Solidarity against COVID-19." *CGTN*, 18 June 2020, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-06-18/China-Africa-summit-upholds-solidarity-against-COVID-19-Rqb38J1X9u/index.html>.
- King, Kenneth. "China Will Continue to Back Confucius Institutes in Africa." *Opinion - Chinadaily.com.cn*, China Daily Paper, 24 Aug. 2018, www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/24/WS5b835c0aa310add14f387e76.html.
- Kinsman, Matthew R, and Kathleen M Murphy. "Biden Administration Maintains Status Quo on EU Product Tariffs (At Least for Now)." *The National Law Review*, The National Law Forum, 15 Feb. 2021, www.natlawreview.com/article/biden-administration-maintains-status-quo-eu-product-tariffs-least-now#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20the%20Trump%20administration,Scotch%20whisky%20and%20Spanish%20olives.
- Kliman, Daniel. "Leverage the New US International Development Finance Corporation to Compete with China." *TheHill*, Capitol Hill Publishing Corp., 16 Nov. 2018, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/416904-leverage-us-international-development-finance-corporation-compete-with-china>.

- Kratz, Agatha, et al. "Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update." *MERICs*, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 8 Apr. 2020, <https://merics.org/en/report/chinese-fdi-europe-2019-update>.
- Kuo, Mercy A. "Italy's China Card in EU-US Relations." *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 14 Dec. 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/italys-china-card-in-eu-us-relations/>.
- Lau, Stuart. "China's Eastern Europe Strategy Gets the Cold Shoulder." *POLITICO*, POLITICO, 9 Feb. 2021, www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-eastern-europe-trade-agriculture-strategy-gets-the-cold-shoulder/
- Lawder, David. "World Bank Adopts \$1 Billion-plus Annual China Lending Plan over U.S. Objections." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 6 Dec. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-china-idUSKBN1YA038.
- Link, Jordan. "Analysis | How Huawei Could Survive Trump." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 10 June 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/10/what-do-we-know-about-huaweis-africa-presence/.
- Macri, John. "How Hungary's Path Leads to China's Belt and Road." *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 11 Apr. 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/how-hungarys-path-leads-to-chinas-belt-and-road/>.
- "Macron Veut Que L'Afrique Arrête De S'endetter Massivement Auprès De La Chine." *Agence Ecofin*, 2021, www.agenceecofin.com/multimedia/2202-85444-macron-veut-que-l-afrique-arrete-de-s-endetter-massivement-aupres-de-la-chine.
- Madden, Payce. "Figure of the Week: Foreign Direct Investment in Africa." *Brookings*, Brookings Institution, 9 Oct. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/10/09/figure-of-the-week-foreign-direct-investment-in-africa/.
- de Maio, Giovanna. "Why the US-Italy Relationship Matters." *Atlantic Council*, Atlantic Council, 26 Jan. 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/why-the-us-italy-relationship-matters/.
- "Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel." *Operation Barkhane - Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel*, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/operation_barkhane.
- "Map of French Military Bases in the Sahel." Drawing down? Macron's African Mission, *The Economist*, 15 Feb. 2021, https://espresso-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/files/public/images/20210220_DAM917.jpg

- Mardell, Jacob, et al. "Responding to China's Belt and Road Initiative: Two Steps for a European Strategy." *MERICs*, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 26 June 2018, <https://merics.org/en/analysis/responding-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-two-steps-european-strategy>.
- Mashal, Mujib, and Vivian Yee. "The Newest Diplomatic Currency: Covid-19 Vaccines." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 11 Feb. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/world/asia/vaccine-diplomacy-india-china.html.
- "Massive Gap in Infrastructure Investments in Central and Eastern Europe Compared to Western Europe." *Three Seas Initiative*, 2021, www.3seas.eu/media/news/imf-study-reveals-1-15-trillion-euro-gap-in-infrastructure-investments-in-central-and-eastern-europe-compared-to-western-europe.
- Mead, Nick Van. "China in Africa: Win-Win Development, or a New Colonialism?" *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 31 July 2018, www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/china-in-africa-win-win-development-or-a-new-colonialism.
- Mina MJ, Metcalf CJE, McDermott AB, Douek DC, Farrar J, Grenfell BT. A Global Immunological Observatory to meet a time of pandemics. *Elife*. 2020 Jun 8;9:e58989. doi: 10.7554/eLife.58989. PMID: 32510329; PMCID: PMC7292646.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The Netherlands and China: a new balance." *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 2019.
- Nedopil, Christoph. "Investments in the Belt and Road Initiative." *Green Belt and Road Initiative Center*, International Institute for Green Finance, 2021, <https://green-bri.org/investments-in-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>.
- Netherlands, Statistics. "Rise in Domestic Exports to China." *Statistics Netherlands*, <https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2020/26/rise-in-domestic-exports-to-china>. Accessed 4 Apr. 2021.
- "Our Funding." *International Finance Cooperation*, World Bank Group, www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC_New/Investor+Relations/Funding/.
- Paszak, Paweł. "Poland-China Relations in 2021: Current State and Prospects." *Warsaw Institute*, Warsaw Institute, 5 Feb. 2021, <https://warsawinstitute.org/poland-china-relations-2021-current-state-prospects/>.
- Patel, Nirav. "Figure of the Week: Understanding Poverty in Africa." *Brookings*, Brookings Institute, 21 Nov. 2018, www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/11/21/figure-of-the-week-understanding-poverty-in-africa/.

- “Poland and China Sign Universal Strategic Partnership Pact.” *Polskie Radio Dla Zagranicy*, Polskie Radio S.A., 20 June 2016, <https://archiwum.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/257974,Poland-and-China-sign-universal-strategic-partnership-pact>.
- “Poland and China Sign Universal Strategic Partnership Pact.” *Polskie Radio Dla Zagranicy*, Polskie Radio S.A., 2016, <https://archiwum.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/257974,Poland-and-China-sign-universal-strategic-partnership-pact>.
- Port, Len. “Democracy and Freedom in Portugal.” *Portugal Resident*, Portugal Resident Open Media, 19 Nov. 2020, www.portugalresident.com/democracy-and-freedom-in-portugal/.
- “President Xi Lauds China-Poland Relations, Eyes to Deepen Ties with CEEC.” *CGTN News*, CGTN, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-03-01/President-Xi-holds-phone-talks-with-Polish-President-Duda-YhyPdVY2Tm/index.html>.
- “Prezydent: Żywimy Oczekiwanie, Że Współpraca w Ramach 17+1 Zacznie Przynosić Bardziej Wymierne Rezultaty.” *TVN24*, TVN24, 9 Feb. 2021, <https://tvn24.pl/swiat/polska-chiny-prezydent-andrzej-duda-o-wspolpracy-gospodarczej-szczyt-171-5015027>.
- Prinsloo, Loni. “Huawei Strengthens Its Hold on Africa Despite U.S.-Led Boycott.” *Bloomberg.com*, Bloomberg, 19 Aug. 2020, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-19/china-s-huawei-prospers-in-africa-even-as-europe-asia-join-trump-s-ban.
- Psaropoulos, John. “Greece and China Hail Strategic Partnership, as US and EU Look On.” *Business and Economy News*, Al Jazeera, 11 Nov. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/11/greece-and-china-hail-strategic-partnership-as-us-and-eu-look-on/.
- “Q&A: Hungary's Controversial Constitutional Changes.” *BBC News*, BBC, 11 Mar. 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21748878.
- Radu, Sintia. “China Is Hurting Innovation, Not Helping It.” *U.S. News & World Report*, U.S. News & World Report, 7 Jan. 2020, www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2020-01-07/chinas-unfair-trade-practices-hurt-global-innovation-report-says.
- Recovery Plan: Powering Europe's Strategic Autonomy - Speech by President Charles Michel at the Brussels Economic Forum*. 8 Sept. 2020, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/09/08/recovery-plan-powering-europe-s-strategic-autonomy-speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-brussels-economic-forum/
- Reuters Staff. “China, Greece Agree to Push Ahead with COSCO's Piraeus Port Investment.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 11 Nov. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-china-idUSKBN1XL1KC.

- Ross, R.S. “It’s not a cold war: competition and cooperation in US–China relations.” *China Int Strategy Rev.* 2, 63–72 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00038-8>
- Rostek-Buetti, Andreas. “Germany’s Car Industry Struggles with Transformation amid Coronavirus Crisis.” *DW.COM*, Deutsche Welle, 2020, www.dw.com/en/what-germanys-car-summit-hopes-to-achieve/a-54841263#:~:text=The%20mixture%20is%20especially%20toxic,is%20made%20by%20the%20industry.
- Scheppele, Kim Lane. “Europe’s Largest Party Suspends Its Resident Autocrat-for Now.” *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, 28 Mar. 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2019-03-28/europes-largest-party-suspends-its-resident-autocrat-now.
- Schulze, Elizabeth. “Understanding the Difference between the IMF and World Bank.” *CNBC*, CNBC, 14 Oct. 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/10/14/understanding-the-difference-between-the-imf-and-world-bank.html.
- Schwarzenberg, Andres B. *Tracking China’s Global Economic Activities: Data Challenges and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service, 14 July 2020, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46302.pdf.>
- Solana, Javier, and Eugenio Bregolat. “Biden Can Pass His China Test.” *Brookings*, The Brookings Institution, 26 Jan. 2021, [www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/26/biden-can-pass-his-china-test/.](http://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/26/biden-can-pass-his-china-test/)
- Soric, Miodrag. “Opinion: China Uses Coronavirus Vaccine to Expand Influence: DW: 30.01.2021.” *DW.COM*, www.dw.com/en/opinion-china-uses-coronavirus-vaccine-to-expand-influence/a-56393862.
- Spike, Justin. “Chinese Vaccine Arrives in Hungary, a First in the EU.” *Medical Xpress*, Science X Network, 16 Feb. 2021, <https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-02-chinese-vaccine-hungary-eu.html.>
- Stojkovski, Bojan. “Big Brother Comes to Belgrade.” *Foreign Policy*, The Slate Group, 18 June 2019, [https://foreignpolicy-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/big-brother-comes-to-belgrade-huawei-china-facial-recognition-vucic/.](https://foreignpolicy-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/big-brother-comes-to-belgrade-huawei-china-facial-recognition-vucic/)
- “Tallinn Summit Marks Significant Progress in Three Seas Initiative.” *Atlantic Council*, Atlantic Council, 3 Dec. 2020, [www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/tallinn-summit-marks-significant-progress-in-three-seas-initiative/.](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/tallinn-summit-marks-significant-progress-in-three-seas-initiative/)
- The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Netherlands and China: A New Balance.” *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 2019, <https://www.government.nl/documents/policy-notes/2019/05/15/china-strategy-the-netherlands--china-a-new-balance.>

- “Three Things to Know about China-Netherlands Relations.” *CGTN News*, CGTN, 14 Oct. 2018, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414e7845444f7a457a6333566d54/share_p.html.
- Tischler, Mark. “China's 'Never Again' Mentality .” *The Diplomat*, Diplomat Media Inc., 20 Aug. 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality/>.
- Trade Indicators*, The World Bank, 2010, https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/Content/Utilities/e1.trade_indicators.htm.
- Voeten, Erik; Strezhnev, Anton; Bailey, Michael, 2009, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data," <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ>, Harvard Dataverse, V17, UNF:6:o5OiqHLeXMiv9Q8w8 +3sVw== [fileUNF]
- Wee, Sui-lee. “China Wanted to Show Off Its Vaccines. It's Backfiring.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 25 Jan. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/business/china-covid-19-vaccine-backlash.html.
- Wee, Sui-lee. “From Asia to Africa, China Promotes Its Vaccines to Win Friends.” *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 11 Sept. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/business/china-vaccine-diplomacy.html.
- “Who We Are.” *The World Bank*, World Bank Group, www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are.
- Wilmot, Stephen. “China Keeps Germany's Car Makers in the Fast Lane.” *The Wall Street Journal*, Dow Jones & Company, 20 May 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/china-keeps-germanys-car-makers-in-the-fast-lane-11589964602.
- Wintle, Thomas. “The Netherlands 'Can Improve' China-EU Relations.” *CGTN News*, CGTN, 27 Aug. 2020, <https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-08-27/The-Netherlands-can-improve-China-EU-relations-ThDc9TiCI/index.html>.
- “World Bank Approved as the First SDR Bond Issuer in China.” *World Bank*, World Bank Group, 12 Aug. 2016, www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/08/12/world-bank-approved-as-the-first-sdr-bond-issuer-in-china.
- Yan, Alice. “Chinese People Must Never Forget the Nanking Massacre Dead: Museum Curator.” *South China Morning Post*, South China Morning Post Publishers, 17 Jan. 2018, www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1737923/chinese-people-must-never-forget-nanking-massacre-dead-museum-curator.